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1. INTRODUCTION 
Fraud is a major concern in many spheres of economic life, from the financial sector to public 
transports, from sports to politics and academia, and it is responsible of enormous costs for society. 
For example, the overall gross tax gap in the U.S. represents more than 16% of the estimated actual 
tax liability (IRS) and insurance fraud is estimated to be around 10% of all claim expenditures in the 
U.S. (Mazar et al., 2008). The recent Panama Papers scandal has focused the attention on the 
importance of evasion in tax heavens. Corporate scandals (e.g., Enron, Société Générale, Volkswagen) 
entail immediate repercussions on the stock market and may durably undermine consumers’ trust. 
Understanding better the determinants of the attitudes toward fraud is undoubtedly a major challenge 
to develop more effective policies.  
The lack of reliable data on activities that are, by definition, secretive contributes to explain the 
recent booming of laboratory experiments studying dishonesty.1 These experiments have renewed 
considerably our knowledge by challenging the standard economics-of-crime approach (Becker, 
1968). In particular, they have revealed a large diversity in the attitudes towards cheating, showing 
that the decision to engage or not in fraud does not result only from an evaluation of benefits and costs 
(e.g., Erat and Gneezy, 2012; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Gibson et al., 2013; Abeler et al., 
2014).2 However, although the advantages of using the laboratory to study dishonesty are many, one 
potential limitation arises from the fact that this setting is highly artificial and the results may not 
generalize to real settings. This issue, i.e. the generalizability of lab evidence, is a major source of 
debates and the discussion is still ongoing in the profession (see e.g., Levitt and List, 2007; Falk and 
Heckman, 2009; Camerer, 2015; Fréchette and Schotter, 2015; Charness and Fehr, 2015). 
The main aim of this study is analyzing whether the diversity of attitudes towards cheating that 
has been identified by means of various laboratory tasks is correlated with the dishonesty of individuals 
in real life. We study to what extent the findings of laboratory experiments on dishonesty are externally 
                                                
1 Irlenbusch and Villeval (2015) review almost 60 articles related to dishonesty published in economic journals 
between 2012 and early 2015. The meta-analysis of Abeler et al. (2016) includes 58 studies on lying based on 
the reports of random draws (coins or dice). Of course, there is an older experimental literature on tax evasion 
(for a review, see Torgler, 2007) and cheap talk games with strategic information transmission (e.g., Crawford 
and Sobel, 1982, Gneezy, 2005; Sutter, 2009) or promises about future behavior (e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg, 
2006). 
2 Subjects frequently do not deceive or lie in a way that maximize their earnings (Gneezy, 2005; Shalvi et al., 
2011; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). Possible explanations are that people want to preserve a good self- 
or social image (Mazar et al., 2008; Gino et al., 2009; Shalvi et al., 2011; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013) 
or they follow moral norms (Vanberg, 2008; Lundquist et al., 2009; Pruckner and Sausgruber, 2013). Subjects 
also condition their decision to lie on the effect that their behavior will have on others (Brandts and Charness, 
2003; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Ellingsen et al., 2010; Maggian and Villeval, 2016), suggesting a role 
for social preferences and guilt. Dishonesty is also sensitive to occupational norms (Cohn et al., 2014), and 
incentive schemes (e.g., Conrads et al., 2013, 2014; Charness et al., 2014). Gächter and Schultz (2016) have 
demonstrated that individual dishonesty in the lab is also directly influenced by the prevalence of rule violations 
in the society.  
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valid with an ordinary population. To achieve this aim, we compare the cheating behavior of similar 
people in the field and in the laboratory by means of an artefactual field experiment (in the sense of 
Harrison and List, 2004) using a diversified sample of 279 passengers of a public transport service in 
France.  
Levitt and List (2007) identify five main threats to generalizability in a typical laboratory 
experiment due to the fact that decision-making involves economic but also moral and ethical 
considerations: the scrutiny of actions by others, a lack of anonymity, the context in which the decision 
is embedded, the self-selection of participants, and the stakes of the game. When studying dishonesty, 
some of these threats may be exacerbated, making generalizability even more challenging. In 
particular, the fear of scrutiny may induce subjects to resist the temptation of cheating because 
observability increases the moral and ethical costs of cheating. Dishonesty also possesses different 
facets and is likely to be context-dependent; thus, decisions may differ if they are taken in or outside 
the lab. This leaves open the question of whether economists are able, by means of a lab experiments, 
to make general claims about dishonesty which hold across different contexts. Moreover, if more pro-
social individuals tend to self-select in participating in experiments, and if social preferences are 
correlated with a higher moral firmness, lab experiments may underestimate dishonesty or 
overestimate the impact of interventions. Although Falk and Heckman (2009) and Camerer (2015) 
address very thoughtfully the limitations to the generalizability of such critiques, our study has been 
designed such as to avoid each of these potential issues. 
We chose to study dishonesty in public transportations because fare evasion is a non-trivial 
offence,3 is widespread in all countries, costs billions of dollars worldwide (see e.g., Donohue, 2010; 
Fürst, 2012; Cour des Comptes, 2016), but is surprisingly understudied.4 In a “policy view” (in the 
terms of Camerer, 2015), it is crucial to determine whether the lab can be convincingly used to 
investigate the determinants of fare evasion in the field and how it reacts to various interventions. Our 
study focuses on small-scale dishonesty that is more prevalent in day-to-day life with dramatic 
consequences for society (Mazar and Ariely, 2006) and, therefore, globally relevant from an economic 
point of view. The level of stakes associated with fare evasion at the individual level is comparable 
                                                
3 Fare-dodging and fare evasion are used interchangeably throughout the paper. They are considered as a crime 
and are defined as using public transports without purchasing the required ticket or without validating one’s 
ticket at the machine.  
4 Surprisingly, economic studies on fare evasion are very few (Boyd et al., 1989; Kooreman, 1993; Nikiforakis, 
2007; Bucciol et al., 2013; Buehler et al., 2014). More can be found in criminology (e.g., van Andel, 1989; 
Hauber et al., 1996; Smith and Clarke, 2000; Kilias et al., 2009). Data from the field are usually not made 
available by companies. Fragmented information comes from newspapers but data are difficult to compare. A 
report of the French Auditing Court (“Cour des Comptes”) released in 2016 on transportations in the region 
Paris-Ile de France indicates that the fraud rate on buses and tramways has increased from about 9% in 2009 to 
about 14% in 2014 but acknowledges that these percentages are underestimated. It indicates that in 2013, the 
number of trips without a valid ticket amounts to 14 million trips on the RER, 23 millions on tramways, 84 
millions in the metro and 123 millions in the buses. 
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with the low stakes in the games used in the lab, which reduces the risk of making inaccurate inference 
from the experimental findings due to too different levels of stakes.  
Another advantage in terms of generalizability of studying fare-dodging is the opportunity to 
observe the dishonesty of ordinary people, and the accessibility of the targeted population. Indeed, a 
very large fraction of the population uses public transports in France, with a huge variety in terms of 
age, income level, occupation, residential location. This contrasts with other recent studies of 
dishonesty in the lab and in the field which target much more specific populations (open air sellers in 
List, 2009; bankers in Cohn et al., 2014; prisoners in Cohn et al., 2015; graders in Armantier and Boly, 
2013; nurses in Hanna and Wang, 2015). Regarding the risk of self-selection, comparisons with data 
collected by the operator (Keolis) indicate that our sample is relatively similar in terms of individual 
characteristics and that our proportion of fraudsters is not below the estimates of the company.  
Our methodology combines standard laboratory and field measures of dishonesty to test whether 
our measures of dishonesty generalize across contexts. Precisely, studying fare evasion allowed us to 
collect three field measures. The first two are based on whether subjects could at the end of the 
experiment display a validated ticket in exchange for a new one (similar to Bucciol et al., 2013), and 
on self-reports.5 For the third measure we recruited a sub-sample of passengers just after they paid a 
fine. The core of our paper consists of correlating these measures of dishonesty in the field to 
dishonesty in the lab, as measured in both an abstract task – a die-under-cup task inspired from 
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) and Shalvi et al. (2011), that eliminates any possible scrutiny6 –
, and a contextualized task – a public transportation game where subjects decide to buy or not a ticket 
to use a fictional bus. We introduced this public transportation game because it allows us to measure 
cheating behavior at the individual level, whereas the die task only allows us to compare the 
distribution of all subjects’ reports to the theoretical distribution of random draws. Note that behavior 
may differ in this game compared to the die task for at least two psychological reasons. Since the 
experimenter is able to identify ex post in the data who has cheated in this game, a feeling of scrutiny 
may affect negatively the decision to lie (if subjects experience a disutility from being exposed as a 
cheater in the experimenter’s eyes). On the other hand, introducing a public transportation context may 
prime the identity of passengers, which may reinforce the fare-dodgers’ willingness to cheat. Our 
                                                
5 Economists are typically reluctant to use self-reports. In our case, this measure is used as a complement and 
can be correlated with our objective measure of fraud. Moreover, studies in psychology show a correlation 
between self-reports on unethical tendencies and actual lying!!(Halevy et al., 2014; Zimerman et al., 2014). 
6 People may not reveal their true preferences if their behavior can be observed. To circumvent this problem, 
economists and psychologists developed recently simple techniques to measure dishonesty in total privacy. 
Besides reporting the outcome of a dice roll in private (e.g., Shalvi et al., 2011; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 
2013; Hao and Houser, 2013; Gächter and Schultz, 2016), they include coin flips (e.g., Bucciol and Piovesan, 
2011; Houser et al., 2012; Abeler et al., 2014), reports on real-effort outcomes (e.g., Mazar et al., 2008; Rosaz 
and Villeval, 2012). In mind games, the experimenter knows the result of the random draw, but payment depends 
on the self-reported accuracy of a prior prediction (Jiang, 2013; Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2015).  
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objective, however, is not to compare cheating in the two tasks, but to test whether the correlation 
between behavior in the field and in the lab holds in these two different environments.  
As a robustness test, we conducted a complementary study with a standard students-subject pool.7 
To get a field measure of dishonesty, we overpaid these subjects at the end of the session and checked 
whether they reported or not the error (like Gneezy et al., 2013, and Potters and Stoop, 2016). 
Our contribution and novelty are fourfold. First, by presenting the first study comparing the 
behavior of actual fare-dodgers and non-fare-dodgers across experimental tasks, we are able to 
investigate whether or not the same persons cheat in different contexts and to validate the external 
validity of lab measures of dishonesty with and without context.8 This constitutes a test of the 
generalizability of lab findings on dishonesty to the field that does not rely on priming methods (such 
as Cohn et al., 2014, 2015) but on direct observation, and that involves ordinary people. Second, we 
can study the consistency of objective measures of cheating with self-reports and whether lab measures 
correlate more with objective measures or with self-reports. Deviations allow us to identify image 
concerns. Third, we provide the first study able to measure the immediate impact of a fine in the field 
on subsequent dishonesty in the lab, by testing whether fare-dodgers who have just paid a fine fraud 
more or less than others when given a new opportunity to cheat. Fourth, we contribute to a better 
knowledge of fare-dodgers, their moral norms and their individual characteristics. 
Our results show that the lab measures of dishonesty correlate with rule violation in real life. The 
proportion of fully dishonest subjects in the die task is higher among passengers who do not hold a 
validated ticket, while the proportion of incomplete liars is the highest among those who hold a valid 
ticket but self-report as occasional fare-dodgers. Our study with students confirms the correlation 
between field and lab measures of dishonesty. Moreover, fare-dodgers who had just paid a fine behave 
more honestly than the other fare-dodgers in the die task but not when context is introduced, which 
suggests a priming effect of context. Behavior in the contextualized task is essentially consistent with 
behavior in the die task and with our field measures of dishonesty, except for passengers without a 
ticket who, however, self-report as non-fraudsters. Indeed, when decisions can be verified ex post, self-
image concerned people cheat less than when scrutiny is impossible. Overall, we show that simple 
tests of dishonesty in the lab are able to capture individual attributes that predict rule violation by 
ordinary people in real life. Showing the external validity of the die-under-cup task is a major finding 
given the large interest for this experimental paradigm in the recent literature on dishonesty. More 
generally, this constitutes a major step in the validation of the use of the laboratory to study how 
                                                
7 By diversifying their subject pool, some studies on dishonesty found substantial differences between 
students and non-student subjects (Utikal and Fischbacher, 2013; Cohn et al., 2014), while others found no 
difference (Abeler et al., 2014). This suggests that more investigation is needed. 
8 This is old debated topic in psychology. Hartshorne and May (1928) claim that cheating in one context cannot 
predict cheating in other contexts, while more recent studies defend the generality of moral behavior (Burton, 
1963). 
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dishonesty reacts to policy interventions. Caution must however be taken when behavior can be 
verified by the experimenter since it may underestimate the dishonesty of image-concerned 
individuals. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 
describes the experimental design and procedures. Section 4 details our results and Section 5 presents 
our replication study. Section 6 discusses the results and concludes. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
This section briefly reviews the various methods used by previous experimental studies to investigate 
the link between dishonesty in the field and in the laboratory and characterizes how we differ from 
these studies.  
One approach consists of examining how societal norms across countries shape individuals’ 
intrinsic standards of honesty and ethical values, as measured in the lab. With a lab experiment 
conducted in 23 countries, Gächter and Schultz (2016) have demonstrated that individual dishonesty 
is directly influenced by the prevalence of rule violations (such as tax evasion, political fraud and 
corruption) in the society. In contrast, our study examines the correlation between the behavior of the 
same persons in the field and in the lab in a given culture.   
Another approach consists of priming the identity of people with a presumed or proven culture of 
cheating. Cohn et al. (2014) show that bank employees, when their professional identity is primed, 
behave more dishonestly in a coin tossing task compared to control groups. This study demonstrates 
the impact of business culture but cannot relate directly (unobserved) individual dishonesty in the field 
to that observed in the lab. Cohn et al. (2015) identify a causal effect of criminal identity on dishonesty. 
Indeed, inmates behave more dishonestly when their criminal identity is primed compared to regular 
citizens, and that the dishonesty of primed and non-primed prisoners, pooled together, is correlated to 
the offences committed in prison. This provides evidence of the external validity of a coin tossing task, 
but with a very peculiar population characterized by persons who committed serious crimes. In 
addition, a large proportion of the inmates were convicted for crimes which are not necessarily linked 
to dishonesty. In contrast, our study focuses on the day-to-day dishonesty of ordinary people, which 
involves small-scale cheating, and we replace priming with a direct observation of individual 
dishonesty in a real setting.9    
A different approach consists of replicating the same experiment in field and lab settings. 
Conducting a field experiment and two lab experiments on bribing, Armantier and Boly (2013) obtain 
                                                
9 Indeed, priming methods may have some limitations. For example, the behavior change observed under priming 
may not occur actually in the real world. This is the case if the priming manipulation induces an experimenter 
demand effect (Zizzo, 2012). Moreover, the effect induced by priming does not tell whether the task is, in the 
first place, able to capture differences in dishonesty in the field.  
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analogous treatment effects, both in terms of direction and magnitude. However, since bribing involves 
joint dishonesty, it may be partly motivated by social preferences and what works for corruption may 
not work for other forms of dishonesty. More importantly, while the authors uncover a clear parallelism 
between the lab and the field, they do not test whether corrupt individuals in the lab would adopt the 
same behavior in the real world. The same applies to Alm et al. (2015) who show the similarity of tax 
evasion decisions of actual taxpayers, students, and non-student subjects in comparable field and lab 
settings, and to Choo et al. (2014) who find a lower compliance of students. By measuring the behavior 
of identical individuals in the field and in the lab, we believe that we provide a stronger test of the 
generalizability of lab experiments on dishonesty. 
Indeed, another method consists of observing the dishonest behavior of identical individuals both 
in a naturally-occurring environment and in the lab. A secondary result of a study by List (2009) on 
open air markets is that cheating, intended as maintaining collusive promises between sellers, 
correlates between a natural and a framed field experiment, whereas little correlation is found between 
cheating rates in the lab and in the other environments when no context is introduced. This last result 
is, however, based on a small sample of 17 dishonest sellers. In the spirit of List (2009), we compare 
the behavior of identical persons in a naturally-occurring situation and in the lab, we manipulate the 
context of the games, and we conduct a similar study with student-subjects. In contrast, our subjects 
are aware of participating in an experiment. Our approach, based on a larger and more general 
population and on a standard lying task, can be very useful to complement previous research and 
provide substantial evidence on the external validity of lab findings.10  
The experiment most closely related to our study is that of Hanna and Wang (2015), run in India. 
It shows that nurses who report more favorable outcomes in a die rolling task are more likely to be 
absent from work.11 Like us, the authors aim to validate a laboratory measure of dishonesty using a 
non-student subject pool by correlating it with a field measure of dishonesty –fraudulent absenteeism. 
In contrast, our study involves a more generic sample of the general population, uses monetary 
incentives, compares different measures of dishonesty in the field, and test the predictive value of 
alternative lab measures with and without context. It thus provides a more complete framework to 
understand whether dishonesty can be reliably measured in the lab.12   
                                                
10 Using a similar approach, Cohn and Maréchal (2015) show that cheating in a coin tossing task predicts school 
misbehavior of middle and high-school students. A major difference with our study is that the violation of 
behavioral rules differs from dishonesty. Other differences include the fact that we compare different tasks.!
11 They also show that students with above median dice score are more likely to be willing to work in the public 
sector where corruption is high. Barfort et al. (2015) find the opposite in Denmark. However, the latter do 
not observe dishonesty in the field.!
12 Hanna and Wang (2015) look at a very specific population, composed mainly of women (95%), and pay 
subjects with candies. The fact that some nurses have been exposed to a biometric monitoring with the goal of 
reducing absenteeism may also have affected the measurement of dishonesty in the experimental task.  
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3. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES AND DESIGN  
In this section, we first present our recruitment methods and experimental procedures. Then, we 
describe the content of the experiment. Next, we explain our measures of dishonesty in the laboratory 
and in the field. Finally, we describe our sample of subjects. 
3.1. Recruitment and procedures 
The experiment was conducted in Lyon (France) during nine consecutive days (excluding Sundays) 
from 11am to 7pm. Recruiters wore a badge (with the word “survey”–“enquête”– written on it) in 
order to prevent being perceived as inspectors. They were instructed to invite subjects at the precise 
arrival of trams and buses at the “Gare Part-Dieu” stop, located in front of the biggest shopping mall 
in the city center and the main train station. The procedure consisted of randomly approaching 
passengers who were getting off the vehicle by asking them whether they were holding a monthly pass. 
The invitation to participate was extended only to passengers without a pass in order to maximize the 
number of potential fare-dodgers participating in the experiment.13 The experiment was presented as 
a study ran by researchers from the University about means of transportation. Potential participants 
were told that the duration of the study was about 45 minutes, that they would have to answer 
questions, that the study was anonymous and did not require any particular knowledge, and that a 
minimum of 25 Euros would be paid in gift vouchers immediately at the end of the study. The recruiters 
were not informed about the aim of the study and if someone asked about its content, they were 
instructed to tell that they did not know. Once a passenger agreed to participate, he was asked to keep 
his used ticket if he had one because it would be replaced with a new one at the end of the experiment. 
The 244 subjects who agreed to participate were escorted to a building located 60 meters from 
the stop, where we had installed our mobile lab (see Appendix 1). Upon arrival, each subject signed a 
consent form, received a tablet and was assigned to a desk. Each desk was isolated by means of mobile 
partitions. Since the experiment was based on individual decisions, we had a permanent inflow of 
participants with a maximum of nine subjects at the same time. We answered questions in private. 
Once a subject completed the experiment, he was escorted to a separate room and paid out in gift 
vouchers. After giving the vouchers, the assistant asked the subject whether he had a validated ticket 
in the purpose of exchanging it with a free day-pass since the ticket was no longer valid.  
In order to measure the immediate impact of a sanction on honesty, we also recruited 35 subjects 
from the Fine Collection Office (FCO, hereinafter) where passengers who are caught to travel without 
a valid ticket and do not pay their fine on the spot can pay their fine. These subjects were invited 
immediately after paying their fine. The rest of the procedure was similar to that used with the other 
                                                
13 Recruiters were also instructed not to invite both members of the same couple or several friends 
simultaneously. They were told not to recruit people who spontaneously offered themselves to take part in the 
study to avoid potential contamination from subjects having already participated.    
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passengers. The experimenter knew when a person was coming from the FCO because he was escorted 
by different recruiters than those who were at the bus and tram stop. This information was recorded 
by a code entered in the tablet.  
A total of 279 subjects participated. To get a sample of passengers as representative as possible, 
participants were sampled based on a stratified random procedure which followed a compulsory survey 
conducted by the local public transport agency TCL-Sytral in Lyon in 2014. Appendix 2 compares our 
subject pool with the population of this representative survey. Our sample differs mainly in terms of 
age (we excluded passengers younger than 18, we slightly over-represent passengers from 18 to 24 
years old, and under-represent passengers older than 60) and status (we over-represent unemployed 
people and under-represent white collars and retirees).  
3.2. Content of the experiment 
The experiment consists of four parts and a final questionnaire. It is fully computerized, including the 
instructions that are displayed on the tablet at the beginning of each part (see Appendix 3). For the 
purpose of this paper, we only focus on the first three parts.14  
First part: Elicitation of attitudes towards risk, ambiguity, and losses. We used Eckel and 
Grossman’s (2008) method with the representation proposed by Eckel et al. (2012). Precisely, subjects 
have to choose one lottery in each of four successive sets of six binary lotteries displayed on a ring in 
different screens. The expected payoff of each lottery increases as one moves clockwise, from 28€ to 
36€, as well as the variance of payoffs. The first set of lotteries is used to elicit risk attitudes in the 
gain domain. Each lottery offers two outcomes, each with an equal likelihood. The second set offers 
the same choices but in the domain of losses. To hold expected earnings constant across tasks, subjects 
receive an initial endowment of €40. The comparison of the choices made in these two tasks gives a 
measure of the subjects’ degree of loss aversion. The next two sets of lotteries offer the same possible 
outcomes in the domain of gains, first, and of losses, next. Like in Cardenas and Carpenter (2013), the 
probability of each outcome is, however, uncertain, with a minimum of 30% and a maximum of 70%. 
Comparing choices in the first and the third (second and fourth, respectively) sets gives a measure of 
ambiguity aversion in the gain (loss) domain.  
Second part: Die-under-cup task. To elicit the subjects’ proneness to lying, we adapted the 
procedure of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). Subjects are first asked to fill out a brief 
questionnaire.15 They are then told that, for answering these questions, they can earn 0, 3 or 5 Euros, 
                                                
14 For the third part, in this paper we only consider the first period. The fourth part consisted of a dynamic public 
transportation game in which subjects had to decide on whether buying or not a ticket and in which we 
manipulated the frequency and regularity of audits, and the information about the future occurrence of audits. 
The results of this fourth part are reported in Dai et al. (2016).  
15 Subjects have to report whether they are fully prepared to take risks or whether they prefer to avoid risks 
on a scale between 0 (“not at all willing to take risks”) and 10 (“very willing to take risks”), using the 
Dohmen et al. (2011) procedure. The second question is similar but in the context of financial decisions.!
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depending on a die roll. The die is inside a sealed cup that allows only the subject to see the die, as in 
Shalvi et al. (2011). We use a six-faced die with three colors rather than numbers. The die can give 
three possible outcomes (red, yellow, blue) with equal probability (1/3). Subjects are instructed to 
privately roll the die twice, and report the outcomes of the two rolls in the tablet. The first roll 
determines the earnings of the task: €0 if the color reported is blue, €3 if yellow and €5 if red. The 
second roll does not give rise to any payment.16 To avoid any error, the text above each reporting 
screen on the tablet reminds the subjects whether his report determines payment or not. This task 
allows us to collect information on full honesty, partial and full dishonesty at the aggregate level, 
without losing too much statistical power since we have only three possible outcomes rather than six, 
in contrast to previous die-rolling experiments.  
Third part: Public transportation game. This part departs from the abstract environment of the 
die task to move closer to a naturally-occurring situation of public transportation. The task is depicted 
as a decision on whether to buy or not a ticket for using an imaginary bus. Seven destinations can be 
reached, each described as a subsequent stop of the bus. For every possible final destination (stops 1-
7), the subject has to decide whether to buy a ticket or not. One decision, chosen at random at the end 
of the experiment, is relevant for payment. The price of the ticket equals €1.70 irrespective of the 
destination (equivalent to the actual tariff). Subjects benefit from using the bus, which is explained in 
terms of time saved. We used two treatments. In the “Variable treatment” (144 subjects), the benefit 
increases in the distance between the departure point and the final destination, in increments of €2 per 
stop, with an expected benefit of €8. In the “Constant treatment” (135 subjects), the benefit is €8, 
irrespective of the destination. The Variable treatment aimed to test whether lies are more likely when 
their relative benefit increases (i.e., when the distance is shorter) rather than when it is fixed (i.e., in 
the Constant treatment). It turns out that there is not much of a difference between the two treatments 
(people cheat more on shorter distances in both treatments), and, thus, we pool them in the data 
analysis. To preserve some comparability with the die task, in period 1 subjects are informed that there 
is no ticket control on the line. Thus, it is clear that lying cannot be punished.17 Since previous studies 
have shown that the introduction of context in a protocol can affect behavior (Cooper et al., 1999) or 
matters for ecological validity (Frechette, 2015), this part allows us to test whether the difference in 
attitudes toward dishonesty between actual fare-dodgers and non fare-dodgers is larger in the 
contextualized game than in the abstract die task. More importantly, this task allows us to measure 
dishonesty at the individual level, in contrast to the die task. The counterpart is that some subjects may 
feel scrutinized since it is possible for the experimenter to check ex post whether they lied or not.    
                                                
16 The second roll is presented as allowing the subjects to check that the die is fair.  
17 After playing period 1, subjects discovered four subsequent periods in this game. In periods 2 to 5, which we 
do not consider in this paper, we introduced various common knowledge probabilities of being controlled and 
fined. The results of the other periods are available upon request.     
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Final questionnaire. At the end of the experiment, subjects fill in a final questionnaire where we 
collect information about the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the subjects (age, 
gender, income category, status, residence), their usage of public transport (frequency, time), and, 
finally, their beliefs and opinion about fare evasion. A full list of the items used in this questionnaire 
can be found in Appendix 3.  
Payments. We paid the earnings of one randomly selected lottery choice in part 1, those associated 
to the reported outcome in part 2, and either the earnings of one decision in one period of part 3 or the 
earnings of three randomly selected periods in part 4. Subjects received between €25 and €110, and, 
on average, €60. 
3.3. Measures of dishonesty  
We collected in total two experimental and three field measures of dishonesty. One experimental 
measure comes from the die task and the other one is given by the public transportation game. In part 
2, we can assess the extent to which our subjects are dishonest by comparing the distribution of the 
reported outcomes of the die roll with the uniform distribution of a fair die roll. In part 3, we measure 
whether and how often subjects do not buy a ticket in the game. While the first measure cannot be 
evaluated for each individual but only for clusters of subjects, the second one is calculated individually.  
Turning to the field measures of dishonesty, one is based on whether a subject is able to display 
or not a validated ticket at the end of the experiment (like in Bucciol et al., 2013). We believe that this 
measure is quite reliable. Subjects were, at the recruitment stage, told to keep their ticket with them 
for replacement with a new one. The motivation was credible since the company uses a time-based 
pricing system and a ticket is valid only within one hour; therefore, it makes sense to compensate a 
ticket-holder with a new ticket for the time spent in the study.18 Even if a passenger does not plan to 
continue his journey, it is attractive to get a free day-pass that can be used any time in exchange for a 
used ticket. The advantage of this measure is that we can convincingly classify subjects who are not 
able to display a valid ticket as fare-dodgers. One limitation, however, is that it is instantaneous; it 
only captures subjects who evaded the fare on that specific day.19  
Our second field measure is based on self-reports in a final questionnaire. Subjects were asked to 
report how many times, on average, they travel without a ticket out of 10 trips. We classify as cheaters 
                                                
18 It is unlikely that subjects trashed their ticket in the bus/tram before being approached by the recruiters since 
this behavior is extremely unusual in Lyon. One can argue that some subjects might have thrown out their ticket 
on the way to the lab. Although we cannot entirely exclude this possibility, we believe it is very unlikely. Subjects 
had to walk only 60 meters from the stop, and had been just advised not to trash the ticket. None of the recruiters 
reported such behavior. Finally, even if few subjects did trash their ticket and were wrongly classified as 
dishonest, it would only make more difficult to detect differences in behavior between ticket holders and non-
ticket holders, and, therefore, it would strengthen our results. 
19 As mentioned earlier, this only reduces the distinction between ticket and non-ticket holders, making any 
difference we detect even stronger.  
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those who report to evade at least once out of 10 trips. The advantage of this measure is that subjects 
who admit to travel without a ticket can be credibly classified as fare-dodgers since they have no reason 
to lie. The disadvantage is that image-concerned fare-dodgers may not be willing to admit that they 
are a cheater.20 
Finally, the subjects recruited at the FCO have, by definition, acted dishonestly at least once, since 
they have been caught during an inspection. We classify them as fare-dodgers but we expect them to 
behave differently in the experiment from the other recruited fare-dodgers. On the one hand, they may 
act more honestly. Indeed, paying a fine may have an “educative” effect on immediate behavior 
because these people have just been reminded that violating the rules leads to punishment. Fare-
dodgers who pay the fine may also, in general, be more honest than other fare dodgers (as a large 
fraction of detected fraudsters who do not pay on the spot never pay their fine). On the other hand, 
they may behave less honestly because of loss repair: they may try to recover the amount of the fine 
by cheating in the experiment (Kastlunger et al., 2009; Dai et al., 2015). For these reasons, these 
subjects are classified as standalone category and their behavior is analyzed separately.  
3.4. Self-selection of subjects 
One might be concerned that evaders are less willing to take part in a study on public transports than 
passengers who used to pay their fare, and that the fare-dodgers who agree to participate are those who 
are the least embarrassed by a violation of the honesty norm (although they are not aware of the aim 
of the study). We explain why we believe that these two sources of selection bias have not plagued our 
study. Table 1 reports the distribution of the subjects based on our measures of fraud in the field.  
Table 1. Distribution of subjects, by measure of fraud in the field 
 Number of trips without a ticket, out of 10 trips (self-reported) Total Percentages 
 0 1 or 2  3 or more 
Ticket holders 
Non-ticket holders 
Total (exc. FCO) 
FCO 
Total (all) 
77 (54.23) 
33 (32.35) 
110 (45.08) 
13 (37.14) 
123 (44.09) 
43 (30.28) 
28 (27.45) 
71 (29.10) 
9 (25.72) 
80 (28.67) 
22 (15.49) 
41 (40.20) 
63 (25.82) 
13 (37.14) 
76 (27.24) 
142 (100) 
102 (100) 
244 (100) 
35 (100) 
279 (100) 
58.20 
41.80 
100 
- 
- 
50.90 
36.56 
- 
12.54 
100 
Notes: Percentages in parentheses. FCO: Fine Collection Office. 
First, Table 1 indicates a high share of fare-dodgers among the participants. Excluding the FCO, 
41.80% of the subjects were not able to display a validated ticket21 and 54.92% reported travelling 
without a ticket at least once every 10 trips. The representatives of the operator confirmed that our 
                                                
20 We believe that allowing people to provide a non-binary answer to this question reduces the number of subjects 
who self-report as non-fraudsters when they are actually fraudsters.  
21 We cannot provide these statistics for the FCO subjects since they may have not used public transports.  
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values are consistent with their measures for passengers without a pass on the lines where we recruited 
our subjects.22 This indicates that fare-dodgers did not self-select out of our study.  
Second, in the final questionnaire we asked subjects to indicate how they perceive a passenger 
who does not pay his fare on a scale from 1 for “I very strongly disapprove” and 7 for “I very strongly 
approve”. 39.20% of the non-ticket holders and 27.56% of the self-reported fraudsters report a value 
lower than 4 (more or less disapprove), while 24.80% and 26.54%, respectively, report a value higher 
than 4 (more or less approve). The corresponding percentages are 59.84% and 18.18%, respectively, 
for the ticket holders and 64.23% and 15.45% for the self-reported non-fraudsters. If only fare-dodgers 
with no shame self-selected in our study, we should expect a higher approval rate among these subjects. 
Moreover, a fraction of the subjects unable to show us a validated ticket self reported as non-fraudsters, 
which suggests that these subjects care about their image. 
4. RESULTS 
In this section, we first consider the general prevalence of cheating in the die task to test whether we 
are able to replicate previous findings. We then divide subjects in categories based on our field 
measures of dishonesty to study whether behavior in the die task is related to dishonesty in the field. 
Next, we investigate whether the relationship between dishonesty in the field and behavior in the lab 
holds in the contextualized transportation game. We then test the extent to which the lab behavior of 
our different categories of subjects differs between the public transportation game and the die task. 
Finally, we report the results of our complementary study ran with students.  
 4.1. Diversity of attitudes towards lying in the die-under-cup task 
As in previous studies, we find that the distribution of the reported outcomes of the first die roll (the 
one that determines payoffs) is significantly different from a uniform distribution (χ2 goodness-of-fit 
test, p<0.001).23 Indeed, 11.11% of the subjects report the lowest outcome (blue, that pays €0) and 
51.97% report the highest outcome (red, that pays €5), both being significantly different from the 
expected value of 33% (binomial tests, p<0.001). 36.92% of the subjects report the medium outcome 
(yellow, that pays €3), which does not differ significantly from 33% (p=0.205).  
                                                
22!The high fraud rate is also due to the recruitment of passengers without a monthly pass. Recruiting metro users 
would have also led to a much lower fraud rate because the access to metro is protected by barriers. The rate of 
self-reported fraud is consistent with a 2011 survey conducted by OpinionWay in Lyon where it was found that 
55% of respondents reported to sometimes travel without a valid ticket (Keolis, 2014). These statistics can also 
be compared to the percentage of non-ticket holders (42.88%) found by Bucciol et al. (2013) in a medium-sized 
city in Italy. Italy and France display amongst the highest rate of fare evasion in Europe (Bonfanti and 
Wagenknecht, 2010).!
23 Throughout the paper, statistical tests are two-sided, unless specified otherwise. Each subject gives one 
independent observation. To compare the distributions of the reported outcomes with the theoretical 
distributions, we use χ2 goodness-of-fit tests. Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests (available upon request) give similar 
results but they are less desirable since they assume continuous distributions.  
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Assuming that subjects never misreport an outcome when it is not beneficial for them, we can 
non-parametrically estimate the percentages of dishonest and honest people in our subject pool (for a 
derivation of these estimations, see Appendix 4). The estimated percentage of honest subjects is 33%, 
while the percentage of income maximizers –who lie by reporting the highest outcome– is 28% at 
maximum. These values are consistent with the estimates of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) who 
found respectively 39% and 22%, using a six-sided die. We can further estimate the percentages of 
partially and fully dishonest subjects. Fully dishonest subjects are those who report the most favorable 
outcome regardless of the actual outcome. We consider two definitions of partial dishonesty. The lower 
bound of partial dishonesty is given by the subjects who report the medium outcome when they roll 
the worst one, assuming that only a fully dishonest subject reports the highest outcome when it is not 
true. The upper bound is that partially dishonest subjects always lie a bit by reporting the next superior 
outcome (yellow when getting blue, and red when getting yellow). This assumes that both fully and 
partially dishonest subjects may lie by reporting the highest outcome. Based on these definitions, the 
percentage of fully dishonest subjects lies in between 0% and 28%, and that of partially dishonest 
subjects between 39% and 67%.  
To sum up, consistently with previous studies we find a considerable diversity of attitudes towards 
lying: a non-trivial fraction of subjects are fully honest in the die task, while the majority behave 
dishonestly but not in a way that maximizes their earnings.  
4.2. Dishonesty in the field and lying in the die-under-cup task 
We now examine the links between dishonesty in the field and behavior in the die task. Figure 1 and 
Table 2 summarize the distribution of reported outcomes of the first die roll for different categories of 
subjects: self-reported fraudsters who do not hold a validated ticket (69 subjects), self-reported 
fraudsters who hold a validated ticket (65), self-reported non-fraudsters who do not hold a validated 
ticket (33), and self-reported non-fraudsters who hold a validated ticket (77). They also report the 
significance of two-sided binomial tests that the observed percentages differ from the expected 33% 
and Table 2 displays the p-value of a χ2 test that the observed distribution differs from the expected 
uniform distribution. These statistics are used as supports for our main results. !
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Notes: The horizontal line identifies the uniform distribution and is located at 33.33%. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01 (two-sided binomial tests that the observed percentage differs from 33.33%.). 
Figure 1. Reported outcomes of the first die roll, by category of subjects 
Table 2. Summary of the distribution of reported outcomes of the first die roll, by category of 
subjects  
Reported outcome Blue  (€0) 
Yellow  
(€3) 
Red  
(€5) 
Avg. 
payoff 
χ2 test  
 
All subjects 11.11 (<0.001) 36.92 (0.205) 51.97 (<0.001) 3.71 <0.001 
Fine Collection Office 17.14 (0.048) 40.00 (0.473) 42.86 (0.281) 3.34 0.124 
Ticket holders 13.38 (<0.001) 40.85 (0.062) 45.77 (0.002) 3.51 <0.001 
Non-ticket holders 5.88 (<0.001) 30.39 (0.600) 63.73 (<0.001) 4.10 <0.001 
Self-reported non-fraudsters 14.55 (<0.001) 30.91 (0.615) 54.55 (<0.001) 3.66 <0.001 
Self-reported fraudsters 6.72 (<0.001) 41.04 (0.066) 52.24 (<0.001) 3.84 <0.001 
    1 or 2 frauds/10 trips 9.86 (<0.001) 42.25 (0.130) 47.89 (0.012) 3.66 <0.001 
    3 or more frauds/10 trips 3.17 (<0.001) 39.68 (0.287) 57.14 (<0.001) 4.05 <0.001 
Non-ticket/Self fraudsters 4.35 (<0.001) 31.88 (0.899) 63.77 (<0.001) 4.15 <0.001 
Non-ticket/Self non-fraudsters 9.09 (0.002) 27.27 (0.580) 63.64 (0.001) 4.00 <0.001 
Ticket/Self fraudsters 9.23 (<0.001) 50.77 (0.004) 40.00 (0.292) 3.52 <0.001 
Ticket/Self non-fraudsters 16.88 (0.002) 32.47 (1.000) 50.65 (0.002) 3.51 0.001 
Note: The first three columns display the percentage of subjects who report the corresponding outcome, and, in 
parentheses, the p-value of binomial tests that the percentage differs from 33.33%. The last column displays the 
p-value of a χ2 goodness-of-fit test that the observed distribution differs from the uniform distribution. 
We state our first result as follows: 
Result 1. Irrespective of which field measure of dishonesty we employ, both fraudsters and non-
fraudsters over-report the best outcome and under-report the worst one in the die task.  
Support for Result 1. Figure 1 shows that both fraudsters and non-fraudsters tend to misreport the first 
die roll to their advantage. More specifically, the distributions of the outcomes reported by ticket 
holders, non-ticket holders, self-reported fraudsters, and self-reported non-fraudsters differ 
significantly from a uniform distribution (see χ2 tests in Table 2). For each category, the percentage of 
reds (blues) is significantly above (below) the expected value of 33% (see binomial tests in Table 2). 
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The percentage of yellows is weakly significantly above 33% only for those who hold a ticket and self 
report as fraudsters. The fact that ticket holders who self report as non-fraudsters report more reds than 
expected by a uniform distribution is not that surprising since this category also includes a fraction of 
fare-dodgers who lied about their status. This leads to our second result: 
Result 2. a) Fare evasion in the field is associated with more dishonesty in the die task. b) The 
relationship is stronger when we consider actual rather than self-reported fare evasion. 
Support for Result 2. Comparing the distributions of the outcomes reported by fraudsters and non-
fraudsters in the field reveals that non-ticket holders lie significantly more than ticket holders (Fisher’s 
exact test, p=0.013), and self-reported fraudsters lie more than self-reported non-fraudsters (p=0.067). 
In particular, non-ticket holders report the best outcome significantly more often than ticket holders 
(p=0.006), and the worst outcome significantly less often (0.085). Self-reported fraudsters report the 
worst outcome significantly less often than self-reported non-fraudsters (p=0.056), but report a similar 
proportion of reds as self-reported non-fraudsters (p=0.797). Since self-reported fare evasion also 
gives an indication of the intensity of dishonesty in public transportations, we explore further the link 
between self-reports and dishonesty in our task; this leads to our third result: !
Result 3. a) Subjects who report cheating more frequently in the field more often misreport the 
outcome of the die roll, especially when they roll the least profitable outcome. b) Occasional fare 
dodgers (i.e., ticket holders who confess to cheat sometimes) tend to lie partially rather than fully. 
Support for Result 3. The distribution of die outcomes reported by those subjects who tell they never 
travel without a ticket is significantly different from that of those who confess cheating thrice or more 
every 10 trips (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.047), but not from those who report cheating only once or twice 
(p=0.274). Subjects who cheat thrice or more report blue in only 3.17% of the cases, a percentage 
significantly below the proportion of blue outcomes (14.55%) reported by subjects who report they 
never travel without a ticket (p=0.020). 
As shown by Figure 1 and the χ2 tests in Table 2, the percentage of reds is significantly above 
33% for each category of subjects, except the self-reported fraudsters holding a ticket. Binomial tests 
in Table 2 indicate that in this latter category, subjects report significantly more yellows, and not reds, 
than expected, which gives evidence of less frequent full dishonesty in this group. Pairwise 
comparisons show that non-ticket holders display a similar lying behavior irrespectively of whether 
they self report as fraudsters or non-fraudsters (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.564), and they in general lie 
more than ticket holders.24 In contrast, among ticket holders, the distribution of reported outcomes 
differs significantly between self-reported fraudsters and non-fraudsters (p=0.077). The self-reported 
                                                
24 Self-reported fraudsters without a ticket report significantly higher outcomes than self-reported fraudsters and 
non-fraudsters with a ticket (p=0.039 and 0.018, respectively). Self-reported non-fraudsters without a ticket 
report higher outcomes than self-reported fraudsters (p=0.068). 
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fraudsters holding a ticket are probably occasional fare dodgers as they admit to sometimes travel 
without a ticket but they carry a valid one on the day of the experiment.  
Finally, we consider the behavior of the subjects who have just paid a fine. 
Result 4. Subjects who have just paid a fine cheat less in the die task than the other subjects who do 
not hold a validated ticket. 
Support for Result 4. The subjects from the FCO can be classified as fare-dodgers. Yet, interestingly, 
their behavior in the die task follows a uniform distribution (see χ2 test in Table 2). If the percentage 
of blues differs significantly from the expected value of 33%, this is not the case for the percentages 
of reds and yellows (see binomial tests in Table 2). The distribution of outcomes reported by these 
subjects is similar to that of ticket holders (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.841), and it differs from that of 
non-ticket holders (p=0.017). In particular, the FCO subjects report a similar proportion of reds, blues, 
and yellows as non-fare-dodgers (p>0.1), but more blues and less reds than other fare-dodgers 
(p=0.076 and 0.046, respectively).  
Additional support for Results 2 to 4. Table 3 displays the percentages of honest, fully and partially 
dishonest subjects in each category, as estimated non-parametrically. It confirms that there are less 
fully dishonest and more honest people among ticket holders and subjects who have just paid a fine. 
The largest (smallest) percentage of fully dishonest (honest) people is among subjects who travelled 
without a ticket the day of the experiment. Subjects who self-report as fraudsters tend to be mostly 
partially dishonest, especially those who were able to display a validated ticket (i.e., occasional 
fraudsters). 
Table 3. Percentages of honest and (partially and fully) dishonest subjects (die task) 
Categories of subjects  
in the field 
Fully 
honest 
Income 
maximizers 
Partially dishonest Fully dishonest 
Lower-
bound 
Upper-
bound 
Lower-
bound 
Upper-
bound 
All 
Fine Collection Office 
33% 
51% 
28% 
14% 
39% 
34% 
67% 
49% 
0% 
0% 
28% 
14% 
Ticket holders 
Non-ticket holders 
40% 
18% 
19% 
46% 
41% 
37% 
60% 
74% 
0% 
9% 
19% 
46% 
Self-reported non-fraudsters 
Self-reported fraudsters 
    1 or 2 frauds/10 trips 
    3 or more frauds/10 trips 
44% 
20% 
30% 
10% 
32% 
28% 
22% 
36% 
25% 
51% 
49% 
55% 
49% 
80% 
70% 
90% 
7% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
32% 
28% 
22% 
36% 
Non-ticket/Self fraudsters 
Non-ticket/Self non-fraudsters 
Ticket/Self fraudsters 
Ticket/Self non-fraudsters 
13% 
27% 
28% 
51% 
46% 
45% 
10% 
26% 
41% 
27% 
62% 
23% 
83% 
55% 
72% 
47% 
4% 
18% 
0% 
3% 
46% 
45% 
10% 
26% 
Additional support for these results comes from a regression analysis in which we control for the socio-
economic and behavioral characteristics of the subjects, and their beliefs and moral norms about 
honesty, since they may drive the differences in behavior between fare-dodgers and non-fare-dodgers. 
Indeed, we have found that the sample of fare-dodgers differs from the sample of non-fare-dodgers in 
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many respects.25 Table 4 reports marginal effects in four multinomial logit regressions with robust 
standard errors in which the dependent variable is the reported outcome of the first die roll.26 In model 
(1), the independent variables include a dummy for holding a ticket, one for self reporting as a non-
fare-dodger, and one for being recruited at the FCO. Model (2) controls for individual characteristics 
(being a male, age, having a monthly income of less than €1000, being a student, being employed, 
having a high school education or lower, living in the city center, living in an upper class 
neighborhood, number of social networks), attitudes toward risk (risk attitude, loss aversion, and 
ambiguity aversion, as measured in the first part of the experiment), usage of public transportation 
(frequency of trips in the previous month, whether the subject travel after 7pm, whether the mean 
duration of the trips is less than 15 minutes, whether the subject uses exclusively the bus, the tram or 
both bus and tram). We also control for moral norms (degree of approval on fare evasion, minimum 
proportion of trips without a ticket to be considered a fare-dodger) and beliefs (belief on the mean 
fraud rate in transportation, belief on the mean probability of control, whether the subject overestimates 
the fine, whether he underestimates it). Models (3) and (4) are similar to  (1) and (2), respectively, 
except that we distinguish between the four categories of subjects, taking the non-ticket holders who 
acknowledge they are fraudsters as the omitted category.   
Table 4 confirms that a subject without a ticket is more likely to report the highest die outcome, 
red, even after controlling for individual characteristics. A self-reported fraudster is more likely to 
report yellow, and less likely to report blue especially if he does not hold a ticket. Finally, a subject 
who has just paid a fine reports more honestly than a non-ticket holder. 27 
4.3. Dishonesty in the field and evasion in the public transportation game 
Our contextualized public transportation game confirms the general relationship between dishonesty 
in the lab and in the field with some differences with the die task, which we summarize in Result 5. 
Result 5. Dishonesty in the public transportation game is associated with dishonesty in the field but, 
contrary to the die task: a) The association is stronger when we consider self-reported dishonesty rather 
than holding or not a ticket. b) Among self-reported non-fraudsters, non-ticket holders behave as 
honestly as ticket holders. c) Subjects who have just paid a fine do not behave more honestly than non-
ticket holders.  
                                                
25 Being a male, having an income lower than €1000, having a high school education or lower, leaving in 
the center or in a lower class neighborhood all increase the probability to be a fare-dodger (non ticket 
holders and/or self-report fraudsters). Actual fare-dodgers have also weaker moral norms of honesty (higher 
approval, more flexibility in the definition of dishonesty, higher beliefs about the fraud rate in public 
transportation in Lyon) (see Appendix 5). !
26 Ordered logit regressions give qualitatively similar results. They are reported in Appendix 10. 
27 In Appendix 7, we complement this study with an analysis of self-justification in the die task. In other words, 
we investigate whether subjects use the information on the second die roll as a self-justification to lie by reporting 
the best outcome of the two die rolls (see Shalvi et al., 2011).!
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Table 4. Determinants of the 1st roll outcome reported in the die task (multinomial logit regressions) 
 (1) (2) 
 Blue (€ 0) Yellow (€ 3) Red (€ 5) Blue (€ 0) Yellow (€ 3) Red (€ 5) 
 dy/dx se dy/dx se dy/dx se dy/dx se dy/dx se dy/dx se 
Ticket holder 0.069 0.048 0.124* 0.064 -0.193*** 0.063 0.092* 0.051 0.127* 0.068 -0.218*** 0.069 
Self-reported non-fraudster 0.069 0.043 -0.132** 0.063 0.063 0.065 0.146** 0.059 -0.186** 0.074 0.04 0.08 
Fine Collection Office 0.139** 0.063 0.051 0.094 -0.190** 0.096 0.127** 0.053 0.020 0.092 -0.146 0.094 
Individual characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 279 279 
Pseudo R2 0.031 0.145 
Df 6 58 
Prob > F 0.02 0.002 
 (3) (4) 
 Blue (€ 0) Yellow (€ 3) Red (€ 5) Blue (€ 0) Yellow (€ 3) Red (€ 5) 
 dy/dx se dy/dx se dy/dx se dy/dx se dy/dx se dy/dx se 
No ticket and self non-
fraudster 0.077 0.082 -0.065 0.107 -0.012 0.107 0.128 0.078 -0.044 0.106 -0.085 0.11 
Ticket and self fraudster 0.079 0.07 0.161** 0.08 -0.240*** 0.083 0.086 0.075 0.209** 0.085 -0.295*** 0.092 
Ticket and self non-fraudster 0.142** 0.065 -0.009 0.081 -0.133 0.082 0.234*** 0.068 -0.063 0.088 -0.171* 0.09 
Fine Collection Office 0.144** 0.072 0.069 0.098 -0.213** 0.1 0.122** 0.059 0.055 0.094 -0.178* 0.097 
Individual characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 279 279 
Pseudo R2 0.032 0.151 
Df 8 60 
Prob > F 0.043 0.001 
 
Notes: Multinomial logit regressions with robust standard errors. The Table reports the marginal effects. Independent variables include individual characteristics, attitudes 
towards risk, usage of public transportation, norms, beliefs. The full regressions are contained in Appendix 6. In models (3) and (4) the omitted category is “No Ticket and 
self-reported fraudster”. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Support for Result 5. Since we have multiple observations per subject (one for each of the seven 
destinations), we measure dishonesty in this game as the rate of ticket fraud, i.e. the proportion of times 
out of all destinations a subject is willing to travel without a ticket knowing that no control is exerted 
(we get one independent observation per subject). Since we find no difference in fraud rates between 
the Variable and the Constant treatments (Mann-Whitney test, p=0.167), we pool the data together. 
Table 5 displays the fraud rate and the percentages of fully honest, partially and fully dishonest subjects 
in the game, for the whole sample and for each field category. Subjects who always buy a ticket in the 
game are classified as fully honest; those who never buy one as fully dishonest; and those who do not 
buy a ticket at least once but not systematically as partially dishonest. Contrary to the die task, observing 
individual behavior gives us precise values for each category.  
Table 5. Fraud rate and percentages of honest and (partially and fully) dishonest subjects  
(Public transportation game) 
  Mean rate of ticket fraud 
Fully  
honest 
Partially  
dishonest 
Fully  
dishonest 
All 
Fine Collection Office 
0.36 (0.37) 
0.42 (0.41) 
38% 
37% 
45% 
40% 
16% 
23% 
Ticket holders 
Non-ticket holders 
0.28 (0.34) 
0.45 (0.38) 
45% 
29% 
44% 
49% 
11% 
22% 
Self-reported non-fraudsters 
Self-reported fraudsters 
    1 or 2 frauds/10 trips 
    3 or more frauds/10 trips 
0.18 (0.31) 
0.50 (0.35) 
0.37 (0.32) 
0.64 (0.32) 
68% 
14% 
20% 
8% 
25% 
63% 
68% 
59% 
7% 
22% 
13% 
33% 
Non-ticket/Self fraudsters 
Non-ticket/Self non-fraudsters 
Ticket/Self fraudsters 
Ticket/Self non-fraudsters 
0.55 (0.37) 
0.23 (0.33) 
0.44 (0.32) 
0.15 (0.29) 
14% 
61% 
14% 
71% 
57% 
33% 
71% 
21% 
29% 
6% 
15% 
8% 
Note: Column (1) displays standard deviations in parentheses. 
Focusing on significant results, we find that, compared to ticket holders, non-ticket holders in the 
field display a higher rate of ticket fraud in the game (0.45 vs. 0.28, Mann-Whitney test, p=0.001); they 
are more fully dishonest (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.033) and less fully honest (p=0.016). Similarly, 
compared to self-reported non-fraudsters, self-reported fraudsters have a higher rate of fraud (0.50 vs. 
0.18, p<0.001); they are more fully (p=0.001) and partially (p<0.001) dishonest, but less fully honest 
(p<0.001). The fraud rate in the game is significantly larger for subjects who report more frequent frauds 
in the field (3 or more, 0.64) compared to those who report less frequent frauds (0.37) or no fraud at all 
(p<0.001 in both cases).28  
Non-ticket holders who self-report as fraudsters are more dishonest in the game than any other 
category (fraud rate=0.55, p<0.001 for each pairwise comparison), followed by ticket holders who self-
report as fraudsters (0.44, p<0.001). The remaining two categories, i.e. ticket and non-ticket holders 
who self-report as non-fraudsters, display similar rates of fraud (0.15 and 0.23, respectively, p=0.211); 
                                                
28 These differences across subject categories hold when analyzing the other periods of this game when we 
introduce positive probabilities of detection. Results are available upon request. 
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these rates are smaller than for the other categories (p<0.001). The proportion of fully dishonest subjects 
is higher amongst non-ticket holders who self-report as fraudsters compared to non-ticket holders who 
do not admit they are fraudsters, and ticket holders who self-report as fraudsters or as non-fraudsters 
(p=0.009, 0.065 and 0.001, respectively). Both non-ticket and ticket holders who self-report as 
fraudsters are more partially dishonest and less fully honest than non-ticket holders who self-report as 
non-fraudsters, and ticket holders who self-report as non-fraudsters (p<0.05). Interestingly, ticket and 
non-ticket holders who self-report as non-fraudsters display similar proportions of fully honest, partially 
and fully dishonest subjects (p>0.1). 
Finally, subjects from the FCO have a higher fraud rate (0.42) than self-reported non-fraudsters 
(p<0.001), irrespectively of whether the latter hold a validated ticket (p<0.001) or not (p=0.038); they 
are also more fully (p=0.025) and partially dishonest (p=0.001). Their fraud rate is smaller (p=0.082) 
and they are less partially dishonest (p=0.004) and more fully honest (p=0.088) than non-ticket holders 
who admit they are fraudsters.  
To test the robustness of these results, we estimate four logit regressions in which the dependent 
variable is the decision to not buy a ticket for a given destination. Since we have multiple observations 
for each subject, we cluster the standard errors at the individual level.29 The independent variables are 
the same as in Table 4, except that we include a dummy for the Variable treatment and a control variable 
for the number of stops needed to reach the destination (from 1 to 7). Table 6 reports marginal effects 
and standard errors.  
Table 6. Determinants of fraud in the public transportation game (Logit regressions) 
 (1) (2) 
 dy/dx se dy/dx se 
Ticket holder 
Self-reported non fraudster 
Fine Collection Office 
Controls for individual characteristics  
Controls for the treatment variables 
-0.093**              0.042 
-0.292***            0.040 
-0.096                  0.069 
No 
Yes 
-0.063              0.043 
-0.155***        0.050 
      <0.001              0.064 
Yes 
Yes 
Number of observations 
Pseudo R2 
Df 
Prob > F 
1953 
0.113 
5 
<0.001 
1953 
0.220 
31 
<0.001 
 (3) (4) 
 dy/dx se dy/dx se 
No Ticket and self-reported non-fraudster 
Ticket and self-reported fraudster 
Ticket and self-reported non-fraudster 
Fine Collection Office 
Controls for individual characteristics  
Controls for the treatment variables 
-0.286***           0.072 
-0.090*               0.048 
-0.386***           0.054 
-0.094                 0.071 
No 
Yes 
-0.173***        0.066 
-0.073             0.053 
-0.214***       0.066 
-0.004             0.065 
Yes 
Yes 
Number of observations 
Pseudo R2 
Df 
Prob > F 
1953 
0.113 
6 
<0.001 
1953 
0.220 
32 
<0.001 
                                                
29 Random-effects logit models give qualitatively similar results (available upon request). 
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Notes: Logit regressions with clustered standard errors. The Table reports the marginal effects. Independent 
variables include individual characteristics, attitudes towards risk, usage of public transportation, norms, beliefs. 
The full regressions are contained in Appendix 8. In models (3) and (4) the omitted category is “No ticket and 
self-reported fraudster”. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Table 6 reveals that self-reported fraud in the field is a better predictor of dishonesty in this game 
than not holding a ticket. Compared to self-reported fraudsters, the non-ticket holders who self-report 
as non-fraudsters behave as honestly as the ticket holders who self-report as non-fraudsters. The 
coefficients of the two variables relative to self-reported non-fraudsters (holding or not a ticket) differ 
neither in model (3) nor in model (4) (p=0.233 and p=0.562, respectively). In contrast, the effect of 
holding vs. not holding a ticket reduces the probability of fraud in model (1), but not in model (2) where 
we control for individual characteristics. These results differ partly from the die task. Our interpretation 
is that the two games do not differ only in terms of context but also in terms of possible feeling of 
scrutiny. Indeed, even if anonymity is preserved, individual behavior can be, ex post, verified by the 
experimenter. This is a crucial difference with the die task where information about the true outcome 
of the die rolls remains private. This difference might explain that the subjects who do not hold a ticket 
but inconsistently self-report as non-fraudsters in the field lie a lot in the die task but not in the public 
transportation game. Image concerns may explain that these non-ticket holders do not acknowledge 
they are fraudsters and that they cheat less when they anticipate that we will be able to check behavior 
ex post. 
4.4. Comparison between dishonesty in the die task and in the public transportation game 
As mentioned earlier, the primary objective of our study is not to compare the cheating behavior in the 
die task and public transportation game, but to test whether the correlation between behavior in the field 
and in the lab holds in these two different environments. The two laboratory tasks in fact differ in many 
respects – most notably in the way dishonesty is measured (at group level in the die task and at 
individual level in the public transportation game) and whether context is used. Therefore, a direct 
comparison would be too noisy. That said, it is still useful to provide some tests on how behavior in the 
public transportation game relates to the one in the die task. In the remaining of this section, we will 
attempt to statistically quantify the extent to which the lab behavior of our different categories of 
subjects differs between the public transportation game and the die task.30  
To make the two measures of lab dishonesty comparable, we construct a standardized measure of 
dishonesty which is based on the payoffs consequences of subjects’ decisions.31 We first compute the 
                                                
30 In Appendix 9, we report additional analysis on the correlation between behavior in the public transportation 
game and in the die task. 
31 This analysis builds upon some of the original techniques used in a recent meta study by Abeler et al. (2016). 
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expected payoff from fully honest behavior (!), the highest possible payoff (!"#$), and the lowest 
possible payoff (!"%&). 32 We then calculate the standardized measure of dishonesty ('() as follows: 
'( = ! − !! − !"%& , ! < !! − !!"#$ − ! , ! ≥ ! 
where ! is the realized payoff.  
This standardized measure can take values from −1 (when..! = !"%& < !) to +1 (when ! =!"#$), and is equal to 0 when the realized payoff coincides with the expected payoff from fully honest 
behavior (i.e...! = !). The average standardized measure, computed for a group of subjects, measures 
how much more money they make compared to a benchmark group of fully honest subjects. In 
particular, the more '( is greater than zero, the more dishonest their behavior is. 
We can now compare this standardized measure of dishonesty across our categories of subjects 
and between our two laboratory tasks by means of a regression analysis. We employ OLS regressions 
with standard errors clustered on each subject to control for the dependence of the decisions between 
the die task and the public transportation game. Explanatory variables include all those used in previous 
regressions, a dummy variable for the task (die task =0; public transportation game = 1), and interactions 
between this dummy and the field measures of dishonesty. Table 7 reports the results of these 
regressions. Figure 2 displays the average marginal effects for our different categories of subjects 
distinguishing between behavior in the die task and in the public transportation game. More specifically, 
Panel A reports the average marginal effects for ticket holders, non-ticket holders, self-reported 
fraudsters, and self-reported non-fraudsters, while Panel B displays the average marginal effects for 
self-reported fraudsters who do not hold a validated ticket, self-reported fraudsters who hold a validated 
ticket, self-reported non-fraudsters who do not hold a validated ticket, and self-reported non-fraudsters 
who hold a validated ticket. 
The results support our previous findings. In particular, while not holding a ticket is a good 
predictor of lab behavior, especially in the die task but also in the public transportation game, self-
reported fraud in the field is a good predictor of lab dishonesty only in the public transportation game.33 
                                                
32 In the die task, fully honest behavior is equivalent to truthfully reporting the outcome of the die. Hence, the 
expected payoff from fully honest behavior is equal to /01021 = €2.67. The highest (lowest) possible payoff is 
equal to €5 (€0). In the public transportation game, since subjects make repeated decisions, we consider average 
payoffs. Fully honest behavior means always buying the ticket. The expected payoff from this behavior is equal 
to 8 – 1.7 = €6.3, where 8 is the average benefit from using the fictional bus and 1.7 the cost of the ticket. The 
highest (lowest) possible payoff is equal to €8 (€6.3). 
33 In previous regressions (see Table 4), we find that, in the die task, self-reported fradusters tend to overreport 
the middle outcome compared to self-reported non-fraudsters, suggesting that they are slightly more dishonest 
than self-reported non-fraudsters. We do not find this in Table 7.  
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In addition, we confirm that, in the public transportation game, non-ticket holders who self-report as 
non-fraudsters behave as honestly as the ticket holders who self-report as non-fraudsters. All this 
supports our interpretation that scrutiny matters for image-concerned subjects (i.e. those who did not 
hold a valid ticket and are uncomfortable to admit they are fraudsters). 
Table 7. Regressions on the standardized measure of dishonesty 
  (1) (2) 
  dy/dx se dy/dx se 
Ticket holder -0.235*** 0.081 -0.244*** 0.088 
Self-reported non fraudster -0.019 0.085 0.005 0.091 
Public transportation game -0.084 0.070 -0.084 0.072 
Fine Collection Office -0.314** 0.136 -0.249* 0.129 
Ticket holder × Public transportation game 0.139 0.094 0.139 0.097 
Self-reported non fraudster × Public transportation game -0.280*** 0.098 -0.280*** 0.100 
Fine Collection Office × Public transportation game 0.191 0.150 0.191 0.154 
Controls for individual characteristics  No Yes 
Number of observations 558 558 
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.144 
Df 7 33 
Prob > F <0.001 <0.001 
  (3) (4) 
  dy/dx se dy/dx se 
No Ticket and self-reported non-fraudster -0.055 0.127 -0.061 0.135 
Ticket and self-reported fraudster -0.260*** 0.099 -0.291*** 0.104 
Ticket and self-reported non-fraudster -0.256** 0.106 -0.239** 0.114 
Fine Collection Office -0.325** 0.138 -0.269** 0.130 
Public transportation game -0.089 0.075 -0.089 0.077 
No Ticket and self-reported non-fraudster × Public transportation game -0.266* 0.152 -0.266* 0.156 
Ticket and self-reported fraudster × Public transportation game 0.148 0.113 0.148 0.116 
Ticket and self-reported non-fraudster × Public transportation game -0.141 0.121 -0.141 0.124 
Fine Collection Office × Public transportation game 0.195 0.152 0.195 0.156 
Controls for individual characteristics  No Yes 
Number of observations 558 558 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.146 
Df 9 35 
Prob > F <0.001 <0.001 
Notes: OLS regressions with clustered standard errors. Independent variables include individual characteristics, 
attitudes towards risk, usage of public transportation, norms, beliefs. The full regressions are available from the 
authors upon request. In models (3) and (4) the omitted category is “No ticket and self-reported fraudster”. * p < 
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
Panel A 
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Panel B 
 
Notes: Average marginal effects. The shaded area identifies the 95% confidence intervals. 
Figure 2. Average marginal effects of the standardized measure of dishonesty 
5. A COMPLEMENTARY STUDY WITH STUDENTS 
So far, we have provided evidence of the external validity of laboratory tasks performed by a pool of 
non-student subjects. Most lab experiments are, however, conducted with students. It is thus legitimate 
to ask whether our results hold with undergraduate students in a typical lab environment. To bridge our 
artefactual field experiment with a conventional lab experiment, we invited 192 University students to 
perform the same die-under-cup task in the context of a typical lab experiment.34 The procedures were 
similar to the field experiment, except for a few changes. First, subjects were recruited on-line using 
the H-root software (Bock et al., 2014). Second, the experiment was conducted at GATE-LAB, Lyon. 
Last, we collected a different measure of field dishonesty, which consists in overpaying subjects at the 
end of the session and see whether they report or not the “mistake” in the payment. This manipulation 
has been used by Gneezy et al. (2013) and Potters and Stoop (2016) in the lab and by Azar et al. (2013) 
in the field.35 Subjects were paid their earnings and 5 extra Euros at their computer station using 
envelopes. The earnings of the experiment (excluding the overpayment) remained displayed on the 
computer screen of each subject during the payment procedures. Subjects were also reminded to check 
the money they received before leaving the laboratory. Those who reported the mistake in the payment 
were classified as honest, and the others as dishonest.36  
                                                
34 The task was added at the beginning of another unrelated experiment. As in our artefactual field experiment, 
we collected data on the subjects’ risk preferences before playing the die-under-cup task. Students are recruited 
from the local engineering and business schools. 
35 In fact, 12 of our 192 subjects were not treated (we did not pay them the extra 5 euros). Indeed, in the first two 
sessions (out of 13) we treated only half of the subjects to make sure that everything worked smoothly. 
36 We acknowledge that this is a crude measure of dishonesty. First, lazy or naïve subjects could leave the lab 
without checking their money. Second, we measure a mild form of dishonesty that requires passive cheating (in 
contrast to the die task where cheating requires active misreporting). All this would, however, only make more 
difficult to detect a correlation between field and lab dishonesty. Hence, if we find one, as we do, this result is 
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Result 6 summarizes our findings: 
Result 6. A conventional lab experiment with undergraduate students replicates a) the diversity of 
cheating behavior in the die task observed with passengers of public transportation, and b) the relation 
between the lab task and a field measure of dishonesty. 
Support for Result 6. The distribution of the die outcomes reported by the students is not uniform (χ2 
test, p<0.001): indeed, the percentages of reds, yellows and blues are 65.10%, 26.56% and 8.33%, 
respectively, showing evidence of widespread cheating. This distribution is also statistically different 
than the one observed in our field experiment (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.018). In particular, students 
report more reds (p=0.06) and less yellows (p=0.021) than people recruited in the field (but not blues, 
p=0.352).  
Next, we test whether cheating in the die task is associated with our measure of dishonesty in the 
field. Figure 3 displays the distributions of the die outcomes reported by the students who do not return 
the extra earnings, on the left, and by those who return them, on the right. Of the 192 subjects who took 
part in the experiment, 12 (6.25%) were not treated, 147 (76.56 %) did not return the extra earnings, 
and 33 (17.19%) returned them. The distribution reported by those who do not return the overpayment 
differs significantly from a uniform distribution (χ2 test, p<0.001). These students report more reds, less 
yellows, and less blues than the expected values of 33% (Fisher’s exact test, p<0.001 for reds and blues, 
and p=0.003 for yellows). Turning to those who return the overpayment, the distribution of their 
reported outcomes also differs from the uniform distribution (χ2 test, p=0.023). In particular, they report 
less blues and more yellows than the expected values of 33% (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.009 for blues, 
and p=0.094 for yellows; for reds, the test gives insignificant results, p=0.464). However, their 
distribution is statistically different than the one reported by those who do not return the extra earnings 
(p=0.002).  In particular, the students who return the overpayment report significantly less reds (39.39% 
vs. 70.75%) and more yellows (48.48% vs. 21.77%) than those students who did not return the extra 
money (p=0.001 and 0.004 respectively). They also report more blues (12.12% vs. 7.48%), but the 
difference does not achieve statistical significance (p=0.482).    
                                                
even stronger. Moreover, passive cheating is relatively similar to fare-dodging where individuals do not buy a 
ticket if they want to cheat, and the monetary stake of the fraud is in the same range of values. 
27 
!
 
Figure 3. Reported outcomes of the first die roll and return of money by students 
Notes: The horizontal line identifies the uniform distribution and is located at 33.33%. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01 (two-sided binomial tests that the observed percentage differs from 33.33%.).  
These results are similar to those obtained with the passengers of public transportation and they 
confirm that simple laboratory tasks measuring dishonesty are able to capture important aspects of 
moral flexibility in the field. 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The data from our artefactual field experiment with a diversified sample of passengers of a public 
transport service confirm that, when given the opportunity to increase their earnings by behaving 
dishonestly in laboratory tasks without any risk of detection, some individuals follow the moral 
principle of honesty, while others act partially dishonestly and others cheat fully to maximize their 
earnings. This diversity of moral behavior is observed regardless of whether the laboratory task is 
abstract (die task) or contextualized (public transportation game). It confirms previous studies 
(Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Gibson et al., 2013). The novelty of our study is to provide 
evidence that this diversity of behavior in the laboratory tasks replicates the diversity of the degrees of 
moral firmness of the same individuals in their day-to-day life, for incentives to fraud of comparable 
monetary value. Indeed, at the aggregate level, the group of passengers who cannot present a validated 
ticket and who self-report as frequent fare-dodgers tends to act fully dishonestly in the die task. In 
contrast, the group of passengers who hold a validated ticket and self-report as never evading fares 
reports honestly the die outcomes more frequently than the other groups. At the individual level, we 
show that fare-dodgers in real life behave also less honestly in the transportation game, while people 
who self-report as non fare-dodgers are less likely to evade. These major findings indicate that simple 
lab experiments can deliver externally valid results on rule violation by ordinary populations. They 
suggest that norm violators have lower intrinsic ethical values than others (since when they cheat they 
are more likely to do it in our different contexts). However, we are cautious not to conclude that context 
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does not matter in general. In particular, in our study we consider cheating for a given level of incentives 
that is relatively similar in the field and in the lab. An interesting extension would be to measure the 
robustness of our findings to a manipulation of the level of incentives. The meta-analysis of Abeler et 
al. (2016) on studies based on reports of a random draw (dice or coins) concludes that reporting behavior 
is not affected by the manipulation of the incentive to lie. On the other hand, Kajackaite and Gneezy 
(2015) show that the insensitivity of lying to incentives results from the subjects’ concern about being 
exposed as cheaters.  In contrast, the impact of variations of incentives on cheating behavior in real 
settings is not well understood yet. Exploring the influence of parallel manipulations of the incentives 
to lie in the lab and in the field is beyond the scope of this study but would be extremely useful. It would 
be also interesting to test whether the correlation that we observe still holds when individuals have 
benefited from positive income shocks in their life. 
We chose a public transportation environment because of its economic relevance (i.e., fare-
dodging concerns ordinary people and entails dramatic revenue losses for transport companies) and of 
the possibility to obtain a relatively simple and reliable measure of dishonesty in the field. One can 
naturally wonder whether our results could generalize to other environments. This is why we conducted 
a complementary experiment with students. In contrast to studies on cooperation in social dilemma 
conducted with both fishermen and students in the lab and in the field (Stoop et al., 2012), but 
consistently with most studies on other-regarding preferences, preferences for efficiency, peer effects 
or market behavior (see the survey of Frechette, 2015, and Herbst and Mas, 2015), we find that the 
students’ dishonest behavior largely replicates that of ordinary people. Indeed, our second study 
confirms the within-subject correlation between dishonesty in the laboratory and in a real setting. Future 
studies could test to which extent our findings might extend to other domains of dishonesty.  
In terms of methodological implications, by showing that cheating in the lab and cheating in the 
field –as measured by objective measures of dishonesty and self-reports– are correlated for ordinary 
people as well as for students, our findings provide support to the external validity of lab experiments 
in a domain that is not easily observable in the field because of its secretive nature. There is, however, 
an important caveat. As image-concerned people are reluctant to admit they are cheaters, in the lab the 
same persons may inflate their degree of honesty if they feel scrutinized. This is similar to what may 
happen in experiments studying pro-social behavior (e.g., List, 2006, Alpizar et al., 2008, Benz and 
Meier, 2008). Our results emphasize the importance of preserving the confidentiality of decisions, 
especially when studying honesty. Indeed, we found that self-reports have a higher predictive value in 
the transportation game than in the die task. This may be driven by the fact that in the former the 
experimenter is able, ex post, to detect dishonesty at the individual level. Subjects who self-reported as 
never cheating although they were not able to show a valid ticket behaved like self-reported fare-
dodgers in the die task (where there is no scrutiny), but like ticket holders in the transportation game. 
Using tasks where decisions can be verified may underestimate the dishonesty of image-concerned 
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individuals who conceal their preferences when dishonesty can be identified even with no risk of 
sanction.  
 We have also shown that individuals who have just been fined in a real setting behave more 
honestly in the die task than other fare-dodgers, which goes against the notion that people try to recover 
their loss. This could be driven by self-selection (those who come to the FCO are more “honest” than 
other fare-dodgers who never pay their fines), by the reactivation of the moral norm of honesty, or by 
the fact that having just paid a fine emphasized the cost of cheating. Our design and the small size of 
the sample do not allow us to disentangle precisely between these various explanations. Moreover, we 
ignore the reason of their sanction and the level of their fine. However, the fact that these subjects cheat 
as often as other fare-dodgers in the transportation game does not support the first explanation. It also 
suggests that the reactivation of the moral norm, if it exists, does not resist the priming of the identity 
of fare-dodgers by the introduction of context in the transportation game. While the role of identity has 
already been shown (Cohn et al., 2014, 2015), an extension could usefully investigate the dynamics of 
self-image and identity in the domain of dishonesty. 
If the lab results can identify reliable both directional and quantitative effects regarding rule 
violation in the field, this is very useful to inform on the underlying mechanisms of dishonesty but this 
is certainly even more important to predict how people react to policy interventions. As developed by 
Camerer (2005), the generalizability of lab results is crucial if one adopts a policy view. The parallelism 
that we have identified in this study should increase our confidence in the use of laboratory methods to 
investigate which manipulation of incentives, sanctions, and moral appeals in the lab is better able at 
deterring dishonest behavior in the field.   
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Appendix 1. Location of the experiment and the mobile laboratory 
Figure A1: Location of the field experiment 
 
 
Note: The distance between the recruitment point and the mobile laboratory (red dotted line) is about 60 meters. 
 
Figure A2: The mobile laboratory on the experimental site 
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Figure A3: Die-under-cup task 
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Appendix 2. Table A1: Background information on subjects and comparison of the subject pool with 
the 2014 TCL Sytral fraud survey in Lyon 
Characteristics 
TCL Sytral Fraud survey 
 01-2014 Our experiment Binomial test  
(p-value) 
%  Corrected  % % 
Nb of 
obs. 
Gender (18444) 
Males 
Females 
 
47.45% 
52.55% 
 
 
46.24% 
53.76% 
 
129 
150 
 
0.719 
Age (17344) 
-18 
18-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-59 
60 and more 
 
13.54% 
31.63% 
21.03% 
12.69% 
13.20% 
7.91% 
 
- 
36.59% 
24.33% 
14.67% 
15.27% 
9.14% 
 
0.36% 
42.65% 
26.88% 
12.19% 
13.62% 
4.30% 
 
1 
119 
75 
34 
38 
12 
 
- 
0.029 
0.329 
0.271 
0.505 
0.003 
Status (17476) 
High school 
Student 
Unemployed 
Blue collar 
White collar 
Manager 
Retired 
Inactive 
Others 
 
15.05% 
24.06% 
5.73% 
3.50% 
33.37% 
7.86% 
6.72% 
2.50% 
1.21% 
 
1.86% 
27.79% 
6.62% 
4.04% 
38.55% 
9.08% 
7.76% 
2.89% 
1.40% 
 
0 
29.03% 
22.22% 
3.58% 
29.74% 
9.32% 
3.58% 
2.51% 
0 
 
0 
81 
62 
10 
83 
26 
10 
7 
0 
 
- 
0.640 
<0.001 
0.879 
0.003 
0.835 
0.007 
0.858 
- 
Usage of public 
transports (17663) 
4 /day or + 
2- 3 /day 
At least 1 /week 
1-3 / month 
Less frequently 
 
 
20.24% 
58.85% 
13.09% 
3.63% 
4.19% 
 
 
 
22.22% 
42.29% 
26.88% 
6.09% 
2.51% 
 
 
62 
118 
75 
17 
7 
 
 
0.412 
<0.001 
<0.001 
0.036 
0.180 
TOTAL 100%                  100% 100% 279  
 
Notes: The 2014 TCL Sytral fraud survey (“Etude de mesure de la fraude”) aims at measuring the rate of fraud on 
the public transportation network in Lyon. The rate of refusal is 2.8%, the number of persons interviewed is 18845. 
This is a representative survey of passengers. The numbers in italics and in parentheses indicates the number of 
responders for each category of questions. The last column reports the p-value of binomial tests comparing our 
subject pool with the TCL Sytral fraud survey. 
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Appendix 3. Experimental instructions 
We report below a reproduction of the instructions of Parts 1, 2 and 3 (only Period 1) which appeared 
on participants' computer screens (translated from French). The instructions of the remaining parts are 
available upon request. 
 
Welcome ! 
This experiment consists of 4 parts.
You will receive the instructions at the beginning of each part. 
There are no right or wrong answers! Please decide based on what seems best to you.
Your earnings depend on your decisions.
You will receive a gift voucher valid in many stores. The value of the gift voucher is equal to your earnings of 
Part 1 + your earnings of Part 2 + either your earnings of Part 3 or Part 4 based on a random draw. 
All your decisions are strictly anonymous.
If you have any question, raise your hand and an assistant will answer your questions in private.
Please remain silent during the experiment or you may be excluded from the experiment and receive no 
payment for your earnings.
OK
 
Part 1 
There are 4 independent periods where you have to choose between lotteries.
At the end of the session, 1 of the 4 periods will be randomly drawn and you will receive the corresponding earnings.
OK
!
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Each lottery below has 2 possible outcomes that have the same chance of being drawn, as in a game of heads or tails.
For example, in the left lottery, you have 1 chance out of 2 to win €12 and 1 out of 2 chance to win €60.
Choose a lottery and then validate.
OK
28€28€70€2€
36€24€
44€20€52€16€
60€12€
Part : 1 of 4 Period : 1 of 4
 
You receive an endowment of €40.
Choose one lottery. Unlike the previous period, a loss is possible. If you make a loss, it will be deducted from your 
endowment.
!12€!12€30€!38€
!4€!16€
4€!20€12€!24€
20€!28€
Part : 1 of 4 Period : 2 of 4
OK
 
40 
!
You do not know what is the chance of the 2 possible outcomes of each lottery. This chance varies between 3 out of 10 and 7 out 
of 10.
Choose a lottery and validate. 
Part : 1 of 4 Period : 3 of 4
28€
?
28€2€
?
70€
24€
?
36€
20€
?
44€16€
?
52€
12€
?
60€
OK
!
You receive an endowment of €40. In case of a loss, it will be deducted from the endowment.
Choose a lottery and validate.
!12€
?
!12€!38€
?
30€
!16€
?
!4€
!20€
?
4€!24€
?
12€
!28€
?
20€
Part : 1 of 4 Period : 4 of 4
OK
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Part 2 
OK
Please answer the following questions.
 
Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?
Give an answer between 0 and 10, with 0 meaning "not at all willing to take risks" and 10 meaning "fully prepared to take 
risks," and then validate. 
Part : 2 of 4
OK
0          1          2           3          4          5          6           7          8          9         10
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And in terms of financial decisions, are you a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?
Give an answer between 0 and 10, with 0 meaning "not at all willing to take risks" and 10 meaning "fully prepared to take 
risks," and then validate. 
Part : 2 of 4
OK
0          1          2           3          4          5          6           7          8          9         10
!
For having answered the previous questions, you will receive an additional gain of € 0, € 3 or € 5.
This gain depends on a roll of a dice which is  contained in the cup on your table.
Part : 2 of 4
OK
!
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You must roll the die 2 times consecutively by shaking well the cup. After each roll, look through the lid the color that appears 
on the top side of the die.
Only the 1st roll determines your gain. The 2nd roll is used to check that the die works.
The possible gains are indicated below.
5€
0€
Now roll the die 2 times. Memorize these results. Then click OK.
Part : 2 of 4
Couleur de la 
face supérieure 
lors du 1er lancer
Votre gain
OK
3€
Color of the top 
side after the 1st
roll 
Your gain
 
 
Click on the color observed on the top side of the die after the 1st roll. This determines your gain.
OK
Part : 2 of 4
5€
0€
Couleur de la 
face supérieure 
lors du 1er lancer
Votre gain
3€
Color of the top 
side after the 1st
roll 
Your gain
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Click on the color observed on the top side of the die after the 2nd roll. This does not determine your gain.
OK
Part : 2 of 4
Couleur de la 
face supérieure 
lors du 1er lancer
Color of the top 
side after the 2st
roll 
 
Part 3 
In this part there are 5 independent periods.
At the end of the experiment, if this part is selected for the payment:
− we will randomly draw 1 of the 5 periods,
− for this period, we will randomly draw one of your decisions. This decision will determine your gain.
You receive an endowment of €8.
If you make a loss in the randomly drawn decision, it will be deducted from this endowment.
OK
!
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Variable treatment: 
 
You take a bus to reach a certain destination. There are 7 possible destinations.
You make a gain thanks to the time saved by taking the bus. The gain increases with the distance.
Taking the bus requires buying a ticket which costs €1.7 whatever the destination.
You may decide to travel without a ticket.
Your final 
destination
Price of the 
ticket
Euros gained 
thanks to the 
saved time
1 1,7€ 2€
2 1,7€ 4€
3 1,7€ 6€
4 1,7€ 8€
5 1,7€ 10€
6 1,7€ 12€
7 1,7€ 14€
OK
Part : 3 of 4 Introduction
Jo
ur
ne
y
 
Decide for each of the 7 possible final destinations if you buy a ticket or not.
There is no inspection.
The program will randomly draw your final destination. Your gain depends on your situation
• You have bought a ticket:                                               Your gain = 8€ of the endowment + the Euros earned – 1,7€
• You have not bought a ticket :                                            Your gain =  8€ of the endowment + the Euros earned
Part : 3 of 4 Period : 1 of 5
OK
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For each possible final destination, decide whether to buy a ticket or not.
No inspection on the line
Your final 
destination
Euros gained 
thanks to the 
saved time
Your decision
1 2€ Ticket 1,7€ No ticket
2 4€ Ticket 1,7€ No ticket
3 6€ Ticket 1,7€ No ticket
4 8€ Ticket 1,7€ No ticket
5 10€ Ticket 1,7€ No ticket
6 12€ Ticket 1,7€ No ticket
7 14€ Ticket 1,7€ No ticket
Part : 3 of 4 Period : 1 of 5
Jo
ur
ne
y
OK
 
 
Constant treatment: 
You take a bus to reach a certain destination. There are 7 possible destinations.
You make a gain thanks to the time saved by taking the bus.
Taking the bus requires buying a ticket which costs €1.7 whatever the destination.
You may decide to travel without a ticket.
Your final 
destination
Price of the 
ticket
Euros gained 
thanks to the 
saved time
1 1,7€ 8€
2 1,7€ 8€
3 1,7€ 8€
4 1,7€ 8€
5 1,7€ 8€
6 1,7€ 8€
7 1,7€ 8€
OK
Part : 3 of 4 Introduction
Jo
ur
ne
y
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Decide for each of the 7 possible final destinations if you buy a ticket or not.
There is no inspection.
The program will randomly draw your final destination. Your gain depends on your situation
• You have bought a ticket:                                               Your gain = 8€ of the endowment + the Euros earned – 1,7€
• You have not bought a ticket :                                            Your gain =  8€ of the endowment + the Euros earned
Part : 3 of 4 Period : 1 of 5
OK
!
For each possible final destination, decide whether to buy a ticket or not.
No inspection on the line
Your final 
destination
Euros gained 
thanks to the 
saved time
Your decision
1 8€ Ticket 1,7€ No ticket
2 8€ Ticket 1,7€ No ticket
3 8€ Ticket 1,7€ No ticket
4 8€ Ticket 1,7€ No ticket
5 8€ Ticket 1,7€ No ticket
6 8€ Ticket 1,7€ No ticket
7 8€ Ticket 1,7€ No ticket
Part : 3 of 4 Period : 1 of 5
Jo
ur
ne
y
OK
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Appendix 4. Non-parametric estimation of the proportions of dishonest and honest subjects 
 
Assuming that subjects never misreport the outcome of the dice roll at their disfavor, a dishonest person 
will always report an outcome which gives positive earnings (€3 or €5). Indeed, for a dishonest subject, 
a 0 is reported as 3 or 5, a 3 is reported as 3 or 5 and a 5 is reported as 5. We assume that a dishonest 
subject who gets a 5 should never report 0 or 3, i.e. we exclude downward lying.37 A honest subject will 
instead report a positive payoff only in two out of three cases (if he/she rolls the yellow or the red face). 
The proportion of positive payoffs (8) that we should observe is thus equal to: 8 = 9 ∙ 1 + 1 − 9 ∙ 23 = 13 ∙ 9 + 23 
where 9 is the proportion of dishonest subjects, and 1 − 9 is the proportion of honest subjects. From 
our data, we observe the proportion of positive payoffs reported by the subjects. We can then compute 
the proportion of dishonest subjects as: 9 = 3 ∙ 8 − 2 
 We can go one step further and distinguish between fully and partially dishonest subjects. The 
interpretation of the fully dishonest subjects is straightforward: fully dishonest subjects are those who 
always report the most favorable payoff (€5). More difficult is the interpretation of the partially 
dishonest subjects. There are two possibilities. A lower-bound interpretation is that these subjects are 
those who behaves dishonestly only when they roll the worst outcome (€0), and report the middle payoff 
(€3). An upper-bound interpretation is that these subjects are those who always lie a bit by reporting 
the next superior payoff. That is they report the middle payoff (€3) if they roll the worst payoff (€0), 
and they report the best payoff (€5) if they roll the middle payoff (€3).38 Based on these definitions, we 
can calculate the proportions of fully and partially dishonest subjects in the population. Combining the 
definition of fully dishonest subjects with the lower-bound definition of partially dishonest subjects, we 
can compute the proportions of best payoffs (8>) and middle payoffs (8?) respectively that we should 
observe in the experiment as:  8> = 9@ ∙ 1 + 9A ∙ 13 + 1 − 9@ − 9A ∙ 138? = 9@ ∙ 0 + 9A ∙ 23 + 1 − 9@ − 9A ∙ 13 
where 9@ is the proportion of fully dishonest subjects, 9A is the proportion of partially dishonest 
subjects , and 1 − 9@ − 9A the proportion of honest subjects. From our data, we observe the proportion 
of best and middle payoffs respectively. We can then solve the system above for 9@ and 9A. The 
solution is: 9AC = 328> − 32 + 38?9@D = 328> − 12  
Combining the definition of fully dishonest subjects with the upper-bound definition of partially 
dishonest subjects, we can obtain a different measure for 9@ and 9A. The proportions of best payoffs 
(8>) and middle payoffs (8?) should be:  8> = 9@ ∙ 1 + 9A ∙ 23 + 1 − 9@ − 9A ∙ 138? = 9@ ∙ 0 + 9A ∙ 13 + 1 − 9@ − 9A ∙ 13 
We can then solve the system for 9@ and 9A, and obtain: 
                                                
37!This is consistent with previous literature (Houser, Vetter and Winter, 2012; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 
2013; Abeler et al., 2014; and Cohn, Fehr and Marechal, 2015) who acknowledge that downward lying may 
occur (for example because of altruism toward the experimenter, a fear of being detected, or a willingness to 
signal that one is not greedy), but assume that this behavior is very unlikely to occur, especially in the lab. 
Utikal and Fischbacher (2012) find that nuns are lying downward, but this is a very specific population.!
38 This definition is also consistent with the case where partially dishonest subjects behaves dishonestly only 
when they roll the worst outcome (€0), and report the best payoff (€5). 
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9AD = 38> − 3 + 68?9@C = 1 − 38?  
Note that our data may not fully support the upper-bound definition of partially dishonest subjects. In 
particular, this definition is valid only if the data satisfy the following condition:  8? ≤ 13 
 
That is, the proportion of middle payoffs reported is not greater than 33%.39 If this condition is not 
satisfied, we can still provide an upper-bound proportion of partially dishonest subjects assuming that 
there are no fully dishonest subjects, and some partially dishonest subjects behave in line with the lower-
bound interpretation of partial dishonesty. This equivalent to solve the following system of equations: 8> = 9AF ∙ 13 + 9AG ∙ 23 + 1 − 9AF − 9AG ∙ 138? = 9AF ∙ 23 + 9AG ∙ 13 + 1 − 9AF − 9AG ∙ 13 
 
Where 9AF  (9AG ) is the proportion of partially dishonest subjects who behave according to the lower-
bound (upper-bound) interpretation of partial dishonesty. The solution is: 9AG = 38> − 19AF = 38? − 1 
 
The total number of partially dishonest subjects is thus:  9AD = 9AG + 9AF = 38> + 38? − 2 
                                                
39 This is equivalent to say that the proportion of fully dishonest subjects is at least 0%.  
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Appendix 5. An analysis of the determinants of fare-dodging 
To investigate the determinants of fare-dodging, we ran a logit regression with robust standard errors 
(see Table A2 below). The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a subject is either recruited at the FCO, 
does not hold a valid ticket at the end of the experiment or self reports as fare dodger. In all these cases, 
for reasons that we already discuss in the paper (see Section 3.3), we can confidently classify a subject 
as fare-dodger. Among the explanatory variables, we include dummy variables for being male, having 
a monthly income lower than €1000, being a student, being employed, having a high school education 
or lower (Education lower than Bac), having children, residing in downtown Lyon, residing in a upper 
class neighborhood, residing in other departments (the baseline for the latter three variables is residing 
in a lower class neighborhood), using the public transport after 7pm, travelling on average less than 15 
minutes per trip, using exclusively the bus, the tram, a combination of  the two (the baseline for the 
latter three variables is using the metro), overestimating the fine, and underestimating the fine; we also 
include non-dichotomous variables for age (18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-59, 60 and over), number of social 
networks, degree of risk seeking, loss aversion and ambiguity aversion (as they are measured in our risk 
lottery tasks), number of trips during the last month, degree of approval of fare-dodging (measured on 
a scale from 1, i.e. “I very strongly disapprove”, to 7, i.e. “I very strongly approve”), number of trips 
out of 10 without a ticket for a person to be considered dishonest (weakness of moral norm), belief 
about the proportion of fare-dodgers amongst travelers, and belief about the probability of being 
inspected. 
 
The results of the regression show that being a male, having an income lower than €1000, having a high 
school education or lower, leaving in the center or in a lower class neighborhood all increase the 
probability to be a fare-dodger. Actual fare-dodgers have also weaker moral norms of honesty. In 
particular, subjects who approve more fare-dodging and those who are more flexibility in the definition 
of dishonesty (i.e. weakness of moral norm) are more likely to fraud. Finally, subjects who believe that 
there is a higher proportion of fare-dodgers in the population and people who think that the probability 
of being inspected is lower are more likely fare-dodgers.  
 
To test whether there are potential differences between the fare-dodgers who were recruited at the FCO 
and other fare-dodgers, we ran a logit regression with robust standard errors on the sample of fare 
dodgers (202 subjects). The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a fare dodgers is recruited at the FCO, 
and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables are the same as in the previous regression. The marginal 
effects are reported in Table A3. We find that the fare dodgers recruited at the FCO are less likely to be 
students and employees. They also believe that there is a smaller proportion of fare-dodgers in the 
population, think that the probability of being inspected is higher, and tend to underestimate less the 
amount of the fine compared to other fare-dodgers. This latter result may be due to the fact that the fare-
dodgers recruited at FCO had just paid the fine, and, therefore, had a better idea of its amount.  
 
These findings indicate that there are few slight differences between fare-dodgers who were recruited 
at the FCO and other fare-dodgers. However, none of these individual characteristics seems to explain 
the lab behavior of fare-dodgers recruited at the FCO. Note in fact that we control directly for these 
individual characteristics in the regression analysis of Tables 4 and 6, and this does not change our 
results regarding the behavior of the subjects recruited at the FCO. 
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Table A2: Determinants of fraud in real life (Logit regression) 
 dy/dx se 
Individual characteristics   
Male 0.085* 0.048 
Age -0.042 0.026 
Monthly income < 1000€ 0.129** 0.059 
Student 0.076 0.069 
Unemployed Ref. 
Employee 0.052 0.062 
Education lower than Bac 0.163** 0.063 
With children 0.057 0.063 
Residence: lower class neighborhood Ref. 
Downtown -0.01 0.053 
Upper class neighborhood -0.187*** 0.066 
Non local -0.088 0.078 
Number social networks -0.001 0.017 
Attitudes towards risk   
Risk seeking 0.024 0.019 
Loss aversion 0.004 0.013 
Aversion to uncertainty 0.015 0.014 
Usage of public transportation   
Frequency of trips in previous month -0.001 0.001 
Trip after 7pm 0.062 0.124 
Mean duration of trips < 15 minutes 0.043 0.062 
Usage of metro Ref. 
Bus exclusively 0.142 0.144 
Tram exclusively 0.179* 0.096 
Various modes excluding metro 0.059 0.097 
Norms and beliefs   
Degree of approval of fraud (1 to 7) 0.033** 0.015 
Weakness of moral norm 0.032*** 0.01 
Belief on fraud rate in transportations 0.002* 0.001 
Belief on control probability -0.001* 0.001 
Correct belief on fine (=€50) Ref. 
Overestimate fine 0.01 0.072 
Underestimate fine -0.094 0.063 
Obs 279 
Pseudo R2 0.310 
Df 26 
Prob > F <0.001 
 Notes: Logit regressions with robust standard errors. The Table reports the marginal effects. Independent 
variables include individual characteristics, attitudes towards risk, usage of public transportation, norms, beliefs. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table A3: Determinants of fare dodgers recruited at the FCO (Logit regression) 
 dy/dx se 
Individual characteristics   
Male 0.078 0.056 
Age -0.039 0.041 
Monthly income < 1000€ -0.044 0.07 
Student -0.129* 0.071 
Unemployed Ref. 
Employee -0.163** 0.076 
Education lower than Bac 0.003 0.056 
With children 0.019 0.079 
Residence: lower class neighborhood Ref. 
Downtown -0.014 0.062 
Upper class neighborhood 0.113 0.083 
Non local -0.084 0.154 
Number social networks 0 0.019 
Attitudes towards risk   
Risk seeking -0.024 0.02 
Loss aversion 0.01 0.015 
Aversion to uncertainty -0.008 0.015 
Usage of public transportation   
Frequency of trips in previous month 0.001 0.001 
Trip after 7pm -0.083 0.09 
Mean duration of trips < 15 minutes -0.002 0.073 
Usage of metro Ref. 
Bus exclusively 0.032 0.092 
Tram exclusively -0.079 0.112 
Various modes excluding metro 0.07 0.072 
Norms and beliefs   
Degree of approval of fraud (1 to 7) -0.008 0.017 
Weakness of moral norm -0.002 0.009 
Belief on fraud rate in transportations -0.004** 0.002 
Belief on control probability 0.002** 0.001 
Correct belief on fine (=€50) Ref. 
Overestimate fine -0.121 0.074 
Underestimate fine -0.232*** 0.078 
Obs 202 
Pseudo R2 0.228 
Df 26 
Prob > F 0.044 
 Notes: Logit regressions with robust standard errors. The Table reports the marginal effects. Independent 
variables include individual characteristics, attitudes towards risk, usage of public transportation, norms, beliefs. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Appendix 6. Tables A4 and A5: Full regression of Table 4  
(Determinants of the 1st roll outcome reported in the die task)  
 (2) 
 Blue (€ 0) Yellow (€ 3) Red (€ 5) 
 dy/dx se dy/dx se dy/dx se 
Ticket 0.092* 0.051 0.127* 0.068 -0.218*** 0.069 
Self-reported non-fraudster 0.146** 0.059 -0.186** 0.074 0.04 0.08 
Fine Collection Office 0.127** 0.053 0.02 0.092 -0.146 0.094 
Individual characteristics       
Male 0.004 0.037 0.116* 0.061 -0.121* 0.064 
Age -0.023 0.028 0.034 0.041 -0.01 0.043 
Monthly income < 1000€ 0.097* 0.059 0.009 0.082 -0.106 0.085 
Student -0.01 0.052 -0.053 0.086 0.063 0.089 
Unemployed Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Employee 0.036 0.054 -0.033 0.086 -0.003 0.09 
Education lower than Bac 0.009 0.042 -0.123* 0.069 0.113 0.069 
With children 0.084 0.063 0.048 0.089 -0.132 0.094 
Residence: lower class neighborhood Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Downtown 0.002 0.044 -0.004 0.068 0.002 0.068 
Upper class neighborhood -0.012 0.054 0.13 0.088 -0.118 0.092 
Non local -0.015 0.066 0.132 0.1 -0.117 0.105 
Number social networks -0.012 0.014 0.018 0.019 -0.006 0.02 
Attitudes towards risk       
Risk seeking 0.003 0.014 -0.044* 0.023 0.041* 0.024 
Loss aversion 0.013 0.01 -0.008 0.017 -0.005 0.017 
Aversion to uncertainty -0.014 0.012 0.002 0.018 0.012 0.018 
Usage of public transportation       
Frequency of trips in previous month -0.001 0 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
Trip after 7pm 0.194*** 0.055 -0.07 0.132 -0.123 0.131 
Mean duration of trips < 15 minutes -0.045 0.06 -0.101 0.087 0.145* 0.085 
Usage of metro Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Bus exclusively -0.031 0.12 0.082 0.149 -0.052 0.139 
Tram exclusively 0.111 0.081 -0.22 0.173 0.109 0.151 
Various modes excluding metro 0.019 0.086 -0.011 0.121 -0.008 0.119 
Norms and beliefs       
Degree of approval of fraud (1 to 7) 0.003 0.011 0.017 0.02 -0.019 0.021 
Weakness of moral norm 0.011** 0.005 0.014 0.011 -0.024** 0.011 
Belief on fraud rate in transportations 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Belief on control probability 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002* 0.001 
Correct belief on fine (=€50) Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Overestimate fine -0.01 0.052 0.003 0.084 0.006 0.085 
Underestimate fine -0.043 0.057 0.012 0.081 0.031 0.084 
Number of observations 279 
Pseudo R2 0.145 
Df 58 
Prob > F 0.002 
Notes: Multinomial logit regressions with robust standard errors. Dependent variable = outcome of the 1st die roll. 
The table reports the marginal effects. Independent variables include individual characteristics, attitudes towards 
risk, usage of public transportation, norms, beliefs. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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 (4) 
 Blue (€ 0) Yellow (€ 3) Red (€ 5) 
 dy/dx se dy/dx se dy/dx se 
No ticket and self non-fraudster 0.128 0.078 -0.044 0.106 -0.085 0.11 
Ticket and self fraudster 0.086 0.075 0.209** 0.085 -0.295*** 0.092 
Ticket and self non-fraudster 0.234*** 0.068 -0.063 0.088 -0.171* 0.09 
Fine Collection Office 0.122** 0.059 0.055 0.094 -0.178* 0.097 
Individual characteristics       
Male 0.005 0.037 0.112* 0.06 -0.117* 0.063 
Age -0.023 0.028 0.036 0.04 -0.012 0.043 
Monthly income < 1000€ 0.099* 0.058 0.001 0.08 -0.1 0.084 
Student -0.007 0.052 -0.083 0.088 0.091 0.09 
Unemployed Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Employee 0.037 0.056 -0.047 0.084 0.01 0.09 
Education lower than Bac 0.01 0.042 -0.136** 0.069 0.126* 0.069 
With children 0.085 0.063 0.038 0.088 -0.123 0.093 
Residence: lower class neighborhood Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Downtown 0.003 0.044 -0.006 0.068 0.003 0.067 
Upper class neighborhood -0.013 0.054 0.153* 0.089 -0.14 0.094 
Non local -0.015 0.066 0.135 0.1 -0.12 0.105 
Number social networks -0.013 0.014 0.018 0.019 -0.005 0.02 
Attitudes towards risk       
Risk seeking 0.003 0.014 -0.042* 0.023 0.039* 0.024 
Loss aversion 0.013 0.01 -0.005 0.016 -0.008 0.017 
Aversion to uncertainty -0.014 0.012 0.001 0.018 0.014 0.018 
Usage of public transportation       
Frequency of trips in previous month -0.001 0 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
Trip after 7pm 0.193*** 0.055 -0.078 0.13 -0.115 0.13 
Mean duration of trips < 15 minutes -0.045 0.057 -0.102 0.084 0.146* 0.082 
Usage of metro Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Bus exclusively -0.032 0.119 0.085 0.15 -0.053 0.143 
Tram exclusively 0.11 0.081 -0.207 0.173 0.098 0.152 
Various modes excluding metro 0.019 0.086 -0.021 0.114 0.002 0.114 
Norms and beliefs       
Degree of approval of fraud 0.002 0.011 0.017 0.02 -0.019 0.021 
Weakness of moral norm 0.011** 0.005 0.012 0.011 -0.023** 0.011 
Belief on fraud rate in transportations 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Belief on control probability 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002** 0.001 
Correct belief on fine (=€50) Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Overestimate fine -0.009 0.052 0.002 0.083 0.006 0.085 
Underestimate fine -0.042 0.056 0.01 0.081 0.032 0.083 
Number of observations 279 
Pseudo R2 0.151 
Df 60 
Prob > F 0.001 
Notes: Multinomial logit regressions with robust standard errors. Dependent variable = outcome of the 1st die roll. 
The table reports the marginal effects. Independent variables include individual characteristics, attitudes towards 
risk, usage of public transportation, norms, beliefs. The omitted category is “No Ticket and self-reported 
fraudster”. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Appendix 7. An analysis of self-justification in the die task 
 
Do people need a self-justification to lie? Shalvi et al. (2011) found that, in the die-under-cap paradigm, 
if subjects can roll the dice several times, they tend to lie more by reporting the best outcome they see 
across all the rolls. The interpretation is that people use the desired counterfactual as a self-justification 
to lie. In our experiment, subjects were asked to roll the die twice. Hence, they could feel legitimate to 
report, for the first roll, the outcome of the second roll if this was more desired. We call this the self-
justification hypothesis. To test it, we construct the theoretical distribution of reporting the best outcome 
of any of the two rolls,40 and compare it to the actual distribution of the reported payoffs from the first 
die roll.  
 
We find that, pooling all the subjects together, the actual distribution is not statistically different from 
the theoretical distribution (χ2 goodness-of-fit test, p=0.423). This evidence supports the self-
justification hypothesis. We can also explore whether fraudsters and non-fraudsters need more or less 
self-justification to lie (see Figure A1). We find an opposite pattern between ticket and non-ticket 
holders. While a self-justification is not sufficient to motivate ticket holders to lie (the distribution of 
the reported payoffs is different from the theoretical distribution at p=0.064), non-ticket holders 
appeared to need less self-justification to lie, although not significantly so (p=0.135). More specifically, 
ticket holders reported significantly less yellows and reds than what it is predicted by the self-
justification hypothesis (Binomial tests, p=0.062 and 0.022 respectively). Non-ticket holders reported 
less blues and more reds than predicted but the differences are not statistically significant (p=0.113 and 
0.111, respectively). The behavior of self-reported non-fraudsters is consistent with the self-justification 
hypothesis (χ2 test, p=0.501). Self-reported fraudsters needed instead less self-justification to lie (the 
distribution of the reported payoffs is different from the theoretical distribution at p=0.083). In 
particular, they reported more yellows than predicted by the self-justification hypothesis (Binomial test, 
p=0.066). Finally, if we consider subjects recruited at the FCO, their behavior is fully consistent with 
the self-justification hypothesis (χ2 test, p=0.269).  
 
To summarize these findings, subjects, in general, behave as if they report the highest outcome of the 
two die rolls, which could denote a strategy of self-justification. This search for self-justification is 
however weaker for actual fare-dodgers, and potential self-justification is not sufficient to motivate 
non-fare-dodgers (especially ticket holders) to lie. 
                                                
40 If subjects report the best outcome of two rolls, we should observe 11.11% of blues, 33.33% of yellows, and 
55.56% of reds. 
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Figure A1: Comparison with theoretical distribution of choosing the highest payoff 
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Appendix 8. Tables A6 and A7: Full regression of Table 6 (Determinants of fraud in the 
public transportation game)  
 (1) (2) 
 dy/dx se dy/dx se 
Ticket -0.093** 0.042 -0.063 0.043 
Self-reported non-fraudster -0.292*** 0.04 -0.155*** 0.05 
Fine Collection Office -0.096 0.069 0 0.064 
Treatment variables     
Variable treatment -0.043 0.041 -0.044 0.041 
Destination (1 to 7) -0.041*** 0.005 -0.041*** 0.005 
Individual characteristics     
Male   0.008 0.043 
Age   0.021 0.025 
Monthly income < 1000€   -0.013 0.057 
Student   -0.006 0.058 
Unemployed   Ref. 
Employee   0.011 0.058 
Education lower than Bac   -0.063 0.049 
With children   -0.159*** 0.057 
Residence: lower class neighborhood   Ref. 
Downtown   -0.044 0.04 
Upper class neighborhood   -0.064 0.064 
Non local   -0.126** 0.061 
Number social networks   0.008 0.012 
Attitudes towards risk     
Risk seeking   0.031* 0.016 
Loss aversion   0.01 0.011 
Aversion to uncertainty   -0.007 0.012 
Usage of public transportation     
Frequency of trips in previous month   0 0 
Trip after 7pm   -0.076 0.064 
Mean duration of trips < 15 minutes   -0.013 0.049 
Usage of metro   Ref. 
Bus exclusively   0.003 0.108 
Tram exclusively   0.031 0.103 
Various modes excluding metro   -0.004 0.071 
Norms and beliefs     
Degree of approval of fraud (1 to 7)   0.015 0.014 
Weakness of moral norm   0.031*** 0.007 
Belief on fraud rate in transportations   0.002** 0.001 
Belief on control probability   -0.002*** 0.001 
Correct belief on fine (=€50)   Ref. 
Overestimate fine   0.028 0.052 
Underestimate fine   0.036 0.053 
Obs 1953 1953 
Pseudo R2 0.113 0.22 
Df 5 31 
Prob > F <0.001 <0.001 
Notes: Logit regressions with clustered standard errors. Dependent variable = decision to not buy a ticket for a 
given destination. The Table reports the marginal effects. Independent variables include individual 
characteristics, attitudes towards risk, usage of public transportation, norms, beliefs. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01. 
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 (3) (4) 
 dy/dx se dy/dx se 
No Ticket and self non-fraudster -0.286*** 0.072 -0.173*** 0.066 
Ticket and self fraudster -0.090* 0.048 -0.073 0.053 
Ticket and self non-fraudster -0.386*** 0.054 -0.214*** 0.066 
Fine Collection Office -0.094 0.071 -0.004 0.065 
Treatment variables     
Variable treatment -0.043 0.041 -0.044 0.041 
Destination (1 to 7) -0.041*** 0.005 -0.041*** 0.005 
Individual characteristics     
Male   0.008 0.043 
Age   0.021 0.025 
Monthly income < 1000€   -0.012 0.057 
Student   -0.002 0.058 
Unemployed   Ref. 
Employee   0.013 0.057 
Education lower than Bac   -0.061 0.049 
With children   -0.158*** 0.057 
Residence: lower class neighborhood   Ref. 
Lower class neighborhood   -0.044 0.04 
Upper class neighborhood   -0.067 0.065 
Non local   -0.126** 0.061 
Number social networks   0.008 0.012 
Attitudes towards risk     
Risk seeking   0.031* 0.016 
Loss aversion   0.01 0.011 
Aversion to uncertainty   -0.007 0.012 
Usage of public transportation     
Frequency of trips in previous month   0 0 
Trip after 7pm   -0.075 0.064 
Mean duration of trips < 15 minutes   -0.012 0.049 
Usage of metro   Ref. 
Bus exclusively   0.002 0.107 
Tram exclusively   0.031 0.103 
Various modes excluding metro   -0.002 0.073 
Norms and beliefs     
Degree of approval of fraud (1 to 7)   0.015 0.014 
Weakness of moral norm   0.031*** 0.007 
Belief on fraud rate in transportations   0.002** 0.001 
Belief on control probability   -0.002*** 0.001 
Correct belief on fine (=€50)   Ref. 
Overestimate fine   0.028 0.052 
Underestimate fine   0.037 0.053 
Obs 1953 1953 
Pseudo R2 0.113 0.22 
Df 6 32 
Prob > F <0.001 <0.001 
Notes: Logit regressions with clustered standard errors. Dependent variable = decision to not buy a ticket for a 
given destination. The Table reports the marginal effects. Independent variables include individual 
characteristics, attitudes towards risk, usage of public transportation, norms, beliefs. The omitted category is 
“No ticket and self-reported fraudster”. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Appendix 9. Relationship between the public transportation game and the die-under-cup task 
 
In this section, we investigate the extent to which the behavior in the public transportation game 
relates to the one in the die task. A priori, we should expect very little correlation between the two 
measures for two main reasons. First, the measure obtained from the die task is very noisy at the 
individual level. Second, as we reported in the main paper, potential scrutiny by the experimenter in 
the public transportation game reduces the willingness to cheat of image-concerned individuals who, 
conversely, fare dodge in the field and cheat in the die task.  
 
If we look at the mean fraud rate in the public transportation game of those who, in the die task, 
report a blue, yellow and red respectively (see Table A8), we find that it is on average higher for 
those who report yellow or red compared to those who report blue. The differences are however not 
statistically significant (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = 0.292; Mann-Whitney tests, p > 0.1 for all pairwise 
comparisons).  
 
Table A8. Fraud rate in the public transportation game based on the first die’s report 
Report in the die-under-cup task 
Fraud rate in the public transportation game 
Mean St. dev. 
Blue (€0) 0.300 0.335 
Yellow (€3) 0.390 0.359 
Red (€5) 0.354 0.388 
 
 
Figure A2. Reported outcomes of the first die roll and behavior in the public transportation game 
 
Notes: The horizontal line identifies the uniform distribution and is located at 33.33%. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01 (two-sided binomial tests that the observed percentage differs from 33.33%.).  
 
We can also look at the first die’s reports of those who, in the public transportation game, always 
buy a ticket (fully honest), never buy one (fully dishonest), and do not buy a ticket at least once but 
not systematically (partially dishonest). Figure A2 displays the distributions of the die outcomes 
reported by fully honest, fully dishonest, and partially dishonest subjects respectively. All categories 
of subjects tend to misreport the first die roll to their advantage. More specifically, the distributions 
of the outcomes reported by fully honest, fully dishonest, and partial dishonest subjects differ 
significantly from a uniform distribution (χ2 tests, p < 0.001). Binomial tests indicate that all subjects 
report significantly more reds and less blues than the expected value of 33% (p < 0.01). Partial 
dishonest subjects also report significantly more yellows than expected (p = 0.018). 
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Comparing the distributions of the outcomes reported by each category of subjects, we only find 
significant differences between fully honest and partial dishonest subjects (Fisher’s exact test, 
p=0.044). In particular, fully honest subjects report more reds (p=0.048) and less yellows (p=0.014) 
than partial dishonest subjects. This is not surprising given our results reported in the paper. Note in 
fact that many actual fare dodgers (non-ticket holders) who self-report as non-fraudsters were 
classified as fully honest in the public transportation game. 
  
Table A9. Determinants of fraud in the public transportation game (Logit regressions) 
 
"" (1) (2) 
"" dy/dx se dy/dx se 
Ticket holder -0.096** 0.043 -0.069 0.044 
Self-reported non fraudster -0.292*** 0.039 -0.157*** 0.05 
Fine Collection Office -0.099 0.069 -0.004 0.064 
1st die report -0.005 0.013 -0.009 0.012 
Controls for individual characteristics  No Yes 
Controls for the treatment variables Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1953 1953 
Pseudo R2 0.114 0.22 
Df 6 32 
Prob > F <0.001 <0.001 
"" (3) (4) 
"" dy/dx se dy/dx se 
No Ticket and self-reported non-fraudster -0.286*** 0.072 -0.177*** 0.067 
Ticket and self-reported fraudster -0.093* 0.049 -0.081 0.053 
Ticket and self-reported non-fraudster -0.389*** 0.054 -0.224*** 0.067 
Fine Collection Office -0.098 0.071 -0.009 0.066 
1st die report -0.005 0.013 -0.01 0.012 
Controls for individual characteristics  No Yes 
Controls for the treatment variables Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1953 1953 
Pseudo R2 0.114 0.221 
Df 7 33 
Prob > F <0.001 <0.001 
Notes: Logit regressions with clustered standard errors. The Table reports the marginal effects. Independent 
variables include individual characteristics, attitudes towards risk, usage of public transportation, norms, 
beliefs. The full regressions are contained in Appendix 9. In models (3) and (4) the omitted category is “No 
ticket and self-reported fraudster”. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
As an additional test of the relationship between the behavior in the public transportation game and 
the die task, we report, in Table A9, the regressions relative to cheating in the public transportation 
game with the inclusion of the reported die roll among the explanatory variables. The regression 
confirms the results above that the behavior in the die task is not a good predictor of the behavior in 
the public transportation game. 
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Appendix 10. Table A10: Determinants of the 1st roll outcome reported in the die task (ordered logit regressions) 
 (1) (2) 
 Blue (€ 0) Yellow (€ 3) Red (€ 5) Blue (€ 0) Yellow (€ 3) Red (€ 5) 
 dy/dx se dy/dx se dy/dx se dy/dx se dy/dx se dy/dx se 
Ticket holder 0.075*** 0.028 0.111*** 0.036 -0.187*** 0.059 0.089*** 0.032 0.123*** 0.04 -0.212*** 0.068 
Self-reported non-fraudster 0.052 0.038 -0.108* 0.059 0.056 0.064 0.073* 0.043 -0.096 0.062 0.022 0.076 
Fine Collection Office 0.090** 0.045 0.132** 0.057 -0.222** 0.098 0.080* 0.042 0.110** 0.055 -0.190** 0.094 
Individual characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 279 279 
Pseudo R2 0.028 0.095 
Df 4 30 
Prob > F 0.006 0.037 
 (3) (4) 
 Blue (€ 0) Yellow (€ 3) Red (€ 5) Blue (€ 0) Yellow (€ 3) Red (€ 5) 
 dy/dx se dy/dx se dy/dx se dy/dx se dy/dx se dy/dx se 
No ticket and self non-fraudster 0.008 0.043 0.011 0.063 -0.019 0.106 0.042 0.047 0.058 0.064 -0.101 0.11 
Ticket and self fraudster 0.085*** 0.032 0.124*** 0.044 -0.209*** 0.073 0.111*** 0.039 0.154*** 0.049 -0.265*** 0.082 
Ticket and self non-fraudster 0.067* 0.036 0.098** 0.046 -0.165** 0.079 0.097** 0.044 0.134*** 0.05 -0.231** 0.09 
Fine Collection Office 0.092** 0.043 0.135** 0.056 -0.227** 0.095 0.086** 0.041 0.119** 0.054 -0.204** 0.092 
Individual characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 279 279 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.087 
Df 4 30 
Prob > F 0.027 0.027 
 
Notes: (1) and (2) are partial ordered logit regressions, while (3) and (4) are generalized ordered logit regressions. “Self-reported non-fraudster” violates the proportional odds 
assumption (Brant test, p=0.023). For this reason, we employ a partial ordered model in (1) and (2). This model relaxes the proportional odds assumption for those variables 
that violate it. All regressions have robust standard errors. The table reports the marginal effects. Independent variables include individual characteristics, attitudes towards 
risk, usage of public transportation, norms, beliefs. The full regressions are available from the authors upon request. In models (3) and (4) the omitted category is “No Ticket 
and self-reported fraudster”. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.! 
 
 
